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ABSTRACT 
Say's Law and Modem Macroeconomics. (April 2001) 
Laurel Cameron Van Allen 
Department of Fconomics 
Texas A@M University 
Fellows Advisor: Dr. Morgan O. Reynolds 
Department of Economics 
Many economists have debated the interpretation of what is known as "Say's 
Law of markets"; it has been the subject of controversy for two centuries. Jean Baptiste 
Say describes Say's I. aw by noting that the "success of one branch of commerce 
supplies more ample means of purchase, and conscqucntly opens a market for the 
products of all the other branches; on the other hand, lhe stagnation of one channel of 
manufacture, or of commerce, is felt in all the rest. "' Twentieth-century economist John 
Maynard Keynes, in an attempt to destroy the credibility of Say's Law, parodied Say's 
l, aw by expressing it as "supply creates its own demand, " and this inaccurate phrase has 
since become well-entrenched in economics. Hence, the disagreement over Say's Law 
extends to its very definition. 
' Say, Jean Baptistc. i1803h, i Treortre on Polrricot Fconontit (New York: Augustus M Kclley 
Publishers, 1971). 135. 
Despite the historical controversy over Say's Law, it has generally been 
neglected in recent years, and modern macroeconomics has virtually disregarded it as 
either erroneous or irrelevant. My approach focuses on five propositions, proving that 
(I) Say's Law is crucial to economics, particularly macroeconomics; (II) Walras' Law is 
its formalization; (III) its implications are far more important than have been previously 
recognized; (IV) modern theorists have neglected Say's Law; (V) the results of this 
neglect have led to theories that stray from sound economic theory. 
The crux of my research involves an in-depth analysis of the major 
commentators on Say's Law, dating from Adam Smith to modern economists. However, 
this research is nol merely interested in history of economic thought; by gaining an 
underslanding of the evolution of Say's Law, I can then assess its role, if any, in 
macroeconomic analysis. In addition to exploring written texts, I consider the opinions 
of prominent modern economists, thereby solidifying the basis for my final conclusions 
about Say's Law and its pertinence to modern macroeconomics. 
I conclude that Say's l, aw is absolutely embedded in sound economic theory, and 
modern economists may implictffy accept Say's Law without readily realizing (or 
crediting) it. In sum, opponents of Say's Law have failed to disprove it, and it remains a 
kcy proposition beneath all greal. macmeconomic analysis of crises. 
Broadly delined, Walras' Lan says that if N-l markets experience excess demand&0, then the Nth 
market must offset thc cxccss demand so that thc aggrcgatc sum of excess demand equals zero. 
For my dad, 
without whom I would not be an aspiring economist. 
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I. Introduction' 
When I began investigating the topic of Say's Law, I met someone who was 
taking a "Principles of Macroeconomics" course. I tnentioned to him that I was 
beginning to conduct research on the meaning& of Say's Law in modern macroeconomics, 
and he asked me, "Wasn't Say's I av" disproved long ago by Keynestm I then realized my 
research addresses a topic that has an impact on virtually every student that takes any 
macroeconomics course 
Many economists have debated the interpretation of what is known as "Say's Law 
of markets", it has been the subject of controversy for two centuries. ' Jean Baptiste Say 
describes Say's Lav by noting that the "success of one branch of commerce supplies 
more ample means of purchase, and consequently opens a market for the products of all 
the other branches, on the other hand, the stagnation of one channel of manufacture, or of 
commerce, is felt in all the rest. "' Economist William 1 Baumol defines the law with 
considerable clarity when he interprets Say's Law as follows "A community's purchasing 
po&ver (effective demand) is limited by and is equal to its output, because production 
provides (J&e merms by which outputs can be purchased "' Twentieth-century economist 
' Tins thesis follows the style and forniat of The (7ucugo. lfunuul of Style. 
Even thc ong&n of Say's La&v remains ihspu&cd. though &t is named after n&neteenth-century economist 
Jean Baptiste Sav. Some believe that James Mill conceived of the law, ivlule traces ol it have been found 
in pre&'ious &vnters, including I'amcd eighteenth-century econonust Adam Snnth Regardless, numerous 
classical ccouoniists expressed the kerr&cl ol'ihc idea m so&nc form, including thc alorcincntioncd. 
Soviell, Tho&nas. , S'a&''. rg&n&'. anB&cror&cn) tiiabris (prmccton princeton Umvcrsib press, Ia72). 3 
' Si&J. Jeau Bapt&ste, [1803l, . t 7' cuirse mi Poli& r-d Ebon m»v. (Nciv York. Augusms M. Ke)tcy 
Pubhshcrs, 1971), (35. 
' Baumo!. Wilham J . Say s (at leas!) Eiglu i. mvs or What Sav and )ainus Min Mav Really Have 
John Maynard Keynes, in an attempt to destroy the credibility of Say's Law, parodied 
Say's Law by expressing it as "supply creates its own demand, " and this inaccurate 
phrase has become well-entrenched in economics since that time. Hence, the 
disagreement over Say's Law extends to its very definition. 
A leader in the marginalist revolution in economics in the 1870s, French 
economist Leon Walras improved the profession's understanding of Say's Law by 
mathematically formalizing the proposition in the nineteenth century. Walras emphasized 
the interdependence of markets and developed what is called Walras' Law, the postulate 
that the sum of excess demands always equals zero in a closed, interdependent exchange 
system. Hence, if many marl ets (products) are in a condition of "glut'* or oversupply 
(disequilibrium), as is true in a business depression, then it implies a shortage in other 
markets, particularly a shortage of money in real economies. ' Hence, gluts and shortages 
must be offsetting J. B. Say is Walras's true intellectual predecessor, and so it is 
important to note that any serious treatment of Say's Law must also consider Walras's 
Law. 
According to classical economists, it is impossible to have a glut across all goods 
or markets simultaneously if money is an economic good and that it is an especially 
important one at that. The greatest ramification of Say's and Walras's assertion is that 
the market system is self-correcting or self-healing because major "gluts" in some markets 
must be offset by shortages in other markets In other words, once displaced or shocked, 
Meant "Ecmtoaucah 44, (Mat 1977), 147 
Defuniton derived from class notes tn Dr Ivlorgan 0 Reynolds'a "Htstorvf of Econonuc Thought- 
there is an auto-control or stabilizing mechanism that steers a market economy back 
toward full-employment equilibrium. Thus, recessions can be remedied in time through 
the flexible market pricing process without any government intervention. Of course, the 
question of whether fiscal and monetary interventions are stabilizing or destabilizing is at 
the heart of modern business cycle theory. 
The implications of Say's and Walras's Law — whether they be true or false — are 
so enormous that few other issues have stirred such a controversy in the field of 
economics. The famed economist John Maynard Keynes remarked that he doubted "if 
many modern economists really accept Say's Law, *' ' and many observers have credited 
him with completely refuting Say's Law Yet his alleged dismissal of Say's Law takes 
only four pages of wrong-headed inquiry, and the merit of Keynes's assumptions and 
analysis have lost considerable esteem in the last fev. decades as the prestige of Keynesian 
economics has deteriorated 
Despite the intense historical debate surrounding Say*s Law, modern 
macroeconomics virtually ignores it. A typical introductory textbook to macroeconomics 
mentions Say*s Law in one sentence, without any analysis Bradley R Schiller's 
introductory textbook, The I;cotttimy I'odtty, states Keynes's version of Say's Law as its 
definition, and then precedes to "discredit" Say's Law by citing the Great Depression s 
course. Texas A%M University. College Station. Texas. October 28, 1999. 
' 
Kcynes. Jolui Maynard. Generrit 'I'heriry of I mptovment, Interest and I toner, (Ncvv York; Harcourt, 
Brace. Ik World, 1985) 219 
Scluller. Bradlei R. . 7'he I:. ononiy Todav. 6'' ed. (New York McGraw I)ill, Inc. 1991), g-t. Schillcr 
provides no anah sis of the causes of lhc Great Dcprcssion. and "rcfutcs" Say's Lavv by claimmg that the 
Great Dcprcssion cxcmplifies an mstance ivhen "tlie classical self-ad)ustment niechanism snnply did not 
ivork" Yct other cconoinisls argue thai the contirnial interventions of the Hoover and Rooscvcll 
Prominent Harvard economist Robert Barro does not mention Say's Law at all in his 
advanced textbook, Macroeconomics. Yet genuine understanding of macroeconomics 9 
cannot be achieved without a clear understanding of Say's Law and its subtle, yet 
powerful, implications. Modern neglect of the axiom has led to a considerable amount of 
confusion in modern economics, particularly in the regard to theories that deny basic 
economics principles, including that of Say's Law. While it is likely that Say's Law has 
never been fully rejected — or fully accepted — by mainstream economists, it has not 
received enough attention in the development of modern macroeconomic theory. 
Some dissection of Say's Law has occurred in the past few decades, most notably 
Thomas Sowell's book on the subject. " However, his analysis falls short, as do the 
analyses ot' the few of his contemporaries who have addressed Say's Law. Previous 
research has mostly focused on the htstoncctt controversy over Say's Law and its 
historical relation to ideas and events Published scholarly literature includes the debate 
between Say and Karl Marx, " the relation between Say and John Stuart Mill, 
" 
an 
analysis of what Say's Law truly says, " an attempt to disprove Say*s Lav' through data 
governments prevented markets from initiating and sustaining an expansion Scc Murray Rothbard. 
. Imemca 's (ireai Depreesiim (Nesv York' Richardson and Suyder. 19113); Alan Reynolds, "What Do Wc 
Knots about the Great Crash?, " ivaiional Resuestu (Novcmbcr 9, 1979), 1416-21, Richard Vedder aod 
Lovvetl Gallavvav, Out oy )pork Irnentptovment and Government in Ttuenttettr Century Atnertca, (New 
York Ncvv York University Press. 1997) 
' Barro. Robert J, , llacroeconoinics 3'" ed (Cambndgc, MA MIT Press, 1997). 
' Sowell. Themis. Sav'u lmi, ln ttusroricat. inc(usus 
" Shoul, Bernice, "Karl Marx aad Say's Lass " C)uarierly, liiurniil ofpconomics, 71(4), (Nov 1957). 
611-29 
Balassa, Beta A . "John Siuart 1Vhll aad the Lasv of Markets, " ()uarterty fournal oj Economics. LXX111 
(2). (May 1959). 263-74 
Bmuuol, William J "Say's (at Least) Eight Lass s, or What Say and James Mill Mas Really Have 
Meant, " Lcoiiomico. 4-), (Mav 1977) 145-61 
demonstrating general overproduction in the economy, " and the relationship between 
Say's Law and the Physiocrats. " In addition, a few books have addressed Say's Law, all 
with the objective of defining the history and meaning of Say's Law. Perhaps the greatest 
contribution to the matter is W. H. Hutt's A Rehabilitation of Saf&'s Larr&', which 
addresses Say's Law with clarity and insight. 
In general, Walras's contributions to economics are more widely accepted than 
are Say's. Perhaps due to Walras's mathematical approach, modern economists 
commonly recognize Walras as an important contributor to macroeconomic theory, and 
several of his developments have been integrated into mainstream macroeconomics. 
Therefore, I will focus on the tie between Say and Walras, and the merit of their 
respective laws 
My hypothesis focuses on five related propositions. I assert that (I) Say's Law' 
is crucial to economics, particularly macroeconomics, (II) Walras' Law is its 
formalization, (III) its implications are far more important than have been previously 
recognized; (IV) modern theorists have negl 
neglect have led to theories that stray from sound economic theory 
I argue that Say's Law is not only a self-evident principle supported both by 
Nersser. Hans. "General Overproduction A Study of Say's I. rrw ol Markets, " Jorrrnot of Polr &&col 
I:r. ononry, 42(4). (Aug. 1934) 433-n&5 ' Spengler. Joseph J. . "The Physrocrats and Say's Lan of Markets I, '*, forrrnrrl of Polrncol f'. cononrv. 
53(3). (Sept 1945). 193-211, -The Physrocrals and Say s Lars ol' Markers II. " Journnf of Puhncol 
Err&nrnny. 53(4). (Dcc 19-15). 317-347. 
"Hun. W H, . I Relnrhrlrrrrln&n of Sov's lou, (Athens' Ohio Universrt) Press 1974) 
Herc I nrean Say's Law o&rd rls esrended ax&em, Walras's Lavv, hcncc. rvhcn I propose lo prose lhc 
will is based upon exploration of well-accepted principles in economics and historical 
evidence supporting my contention. It is important that I establish the veracity — or 
inaccuracy — of Say's Law without merely presuming its verity so that my assumptions 
can be well-defended. 
I show that the connection between Say and Walras whereby Walras's Law is an 
extension and mathematical formalization of Say's Law. I assert that Walras's Law is a 
logical derivation of Say's Law, and my research confirms this assumption 
Once establishing Say's I. aw as valid or invalid, it is important to recognize the 
implications of its actuality or falseness If Say's Law is true, then the substance of 
numerous modern theories, including Keynesian, suffers extensively If Say's Law is 
false, then the classical economists misunderstood markets to a large extent. Hence, it is 
important that I not only establish or reject Say's Law, but that a positive or negative 
assertion of the law results in numerous implications about our understanding of markets 
As my research will demonstrate, Say's Law was and remains valid. 
I observe that, beyond reasonable doubt, Say's Law is conspicuously disregarded in 
modern theory, as evidenced by its lack of emphasis in college textbooks, scholarly 
journals, and economic research in general. 
I contend that Say's Law deserves greater emphasis than it has been given in recent 
years, and economic analysis consistently strays from solid theory when it is ignored. For 
instance, modern macroeconomists tend to separate aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply, thereby ignoring their necessary interdependence, even equality Careless 
impori;mce of Say's Lan l imply an equal verification of the Watrasran Iheorv. 
disregard for Say's Law and widespread ignorance of its importance in economics has 
had serious repercussions in modern theory. Current economic theory is overcome with 
bad theory based upon dubious empirical evidence, and poor theoretical foundations lead 
to even poorer empirical conclusions. 
My research relies upon two main sources: a literature review of published scholarly 
works, and interviews of prominent economists who can share their expertise on the 
matter Literature review will depend upon research conducted through the library and 
academic journal catalogs (such as www. jstor. org) I also conducted interviews with 
experts like Dennis W Jansen, Department Head of Texas A&M University's Economics 
Department, Roger W Garrison, Professor of Economics at Auburn University; and 
Leland B. Yeager, Professor Emeritus of Economics at Auburn University. Since my 
research is theoretical in nature, I will not need to conduct research involving data 
collection or laboratories 
My research involves the nature and signiftcance of Say's Law, as well as the results 
of its neglect. My hypothesis states that Say's Law is crucial to understanding 
macroeconomics and needs greater emphasis in current mainstream economics. I prove 
the importance of Say's Law of markets by establishing its place in economics as the 
cornerstone of macroeconomics Further, it should be treated as a necessary basis for all 
economic theory. 
II. Introduction to Literature Review 
While the controversy over Say's Law has largely been ignored in recent years, 
there continues an ongoing debate in macroeconomics over whether production and the 
supply of goods drive economic activity or whether consumers and demand drive 
economic activity. Several schools of thought have arisen on both sides of the fence, and 
with varying interpretations of the implications of each. For instance, Keynes — perhaps 
the most prominent aggregate "demand-sider" — advocates an active role of government 
in stimulating demand and increasing output and consumption through public initiatives. 
By contrast, the Austrian School emphasizes the role of the consumer or the demand- 
side — as the ultimate director of economic activity but not the initiator of production 
Thus on the supply or production side entrepreneurs "propose" or offer the fruits of 
productive efforts while on the demand side, consumers "dispose" or decide on the 
success or failure of those efforts 
Thus, the overriding debate extends beyond merely a question over the 
phenomenon of general gluts or depression existing in any (and all) markets. The debate 
is over the very nature of markets and over the self-correcting mechanisms that may or 
may not permeate every aspect of market behavior. 
IlI. Richard Cantillon 
Richard Cantillon (1680?-1734) authored Essa( sttr la nature cits commerce en 
general (Essays on the Nature of Commerce in General) published posthumously in 
1755), which is considered to be one of the flrst genuinely systematic texts in economics. 
Though overshadowed by Adam Smith and other British economists, Cantillon remains a 
very important contributor to economics, and is particularly noted by Murray Rothbard 
for his clarity on the price mechanism, WiHiam Stanley Jevons referred to Cantillon's 
contribution as a "systematic and connected treatise" and "the first treatise on 
econonncs, 
"'" 
and Murray Rothbard regards him as "the founding father of modern 
19 
economics. " 
Cantillon provides a raw version of Say's Law in his Esstn, though his influence 
on Say can be seen in several peripheral areas that lead up to Say's logical conclusions 
Both men viewed economics "as a fully integrated structure of abstract and general 
principles. "" Several economists who observe that Say followed the logical methodology 
of Cantillon rather than succumbing to the flavts of Smith have stressed the importance of 
Cantillon's methodology. Say produced a '/iai2ttse that emphasized an axiomatic- 
deductive method similar to Cantillon's that at least indirectly influenced later economists 
(such as the Austrian School). Murray Rothbard credits Turgot (rather than Cantillon) 
'" Jevons. Wilham Stanley "Richard Conti(ton aod the Nationality of Pohttcat Economy. " 
i'ontempoetrrv ttevieat (January t(t(tl), 342, quoted in 13 Great. litstrtnn Econottttsts, ed Wilham 
Holconibe. . (Auburn. Ludtng von Mises Institute, 1999). 13. 
Rothbard. Murray, Fcnnnnric Ttiought ltefoee ndcm, S'miitt. (Londott' Edward Elgar Rttb. 1997). 343- 
62 
with the first genuine explanation of Say's Law, suggesting that the connection between 
Cantillon and Say need not be over-emphasized. In addition, Cantillon emphasized the 
crucial role of consumers in the marketplace, and "the emphasis on the consumer in 
Cantillon and the Physiocrats is one of the elements of their thought that led to Say's law 
of markets. " ' He also infiuenced Say deeply on the topic of entrepreneurs, so much so, 
that Leonard Liggio notes that "from Cantillon, Say developed his theory of 
entrepreneurship by which entrepreneurs compete as brokers buying services of 
productive agencies. These insights contributed to his contribution on the Law of 
Markets "' Cantillon, addressing the supply-side of the market, explains the role of the 
entrepreneur in accepting risk and the potential for providing a good or service at an 
amount unmet by the market demand 
All these Entrepreneurs become consumers and Customers of each other, the 
Draper, of the Wine Merchant, the latter of the draper They adjust their numbers 
in the State to their Customers or to their market. If there are too many Hatters 
in a City or in a street for the number of persons who buy hats there, those having 
the fewest customers wifi have to become bankrupt; if there are too few, it will be 
a profitable enterprise, which will encourage some new Hatters to open shop 
there, and it is thus that Entrepreneurs of all kinds, at their own risk, adjust their 
numbers in a State. " 
Cantillon recognizes the interconnectedness of markets, and how individual markets 
efTect each other Hence, Cantillon built the groundwork for the development of Say's 
" Salerno, Joseph T. . "The Influcncc or Cantillon's E»»at on the Methodology of J. B Say" Journal of 
J, &hertarian Xturhe», 7(2) (1983), &12. 
' Ltggio. Leonard P. , "Richard Cant&lion and the French Economists. Distinctive French Contributions 
to J B. Say "Journal of L&t&ertartan Stiuhe» 7(2), (1985), . 299. 
' ibid, 302 
' Cantillon, Riclmrd. [1755), L's»ai »ur la &iature tlu cr&nnnerce en general, 52. Quoted in Roberi 
Ekelund. Jr . and Robert F Hcbcri, d Ih»tore of Lcoru&nuc Theoru and Alethod, 4' ed. (Nc»v York 
McGrav&-Hilt, 1997). 73 
11 
Law because he emphasized both the roles of entrepreneur and consumer; while he 
grasped the nature of entrepreneurship whereby the entrepreneur faces risk in his 
decision-making process, he did not neglect the fact that successful economic activity is 
contingent on the consumer. Cantillon also "introduced some of the elements of the 
problems in markets" with his analysis of "the process of saving and net capital formation, 
the effects of savings on effective demand for all products and the impact of capital 
accumulation. " »24 
Pigou's real effect is related to Say's Law in consideration of price levels, and it 
has been argued by some, notably Oscar Lange, that Say's Law neglects to account for 
changes in price levels since the classical economists allegedly had no firm grasp on the 
effect of changes in price levels. A weak monetaiy theory suggests that Say's Law would 
then be incapable of properly applying to complex monetized economies, some have even 
argued that Say's Law requires the absence of any monetary theory Cantillon disputes 
this view that the classicals had notliing but a naive view of money His most important 
contribution to Say's I aw lies in the clarity of his monetary theory "Through whatever 
hands the money which is introduced may pass, he writes, "it will naturally increase the 
consumption; but this consumption will be more or less great according to circumstances 
lt will be directed more or less to certain kinds of products or merchandise according to 
the idea of those who acquire the money:v1arket prices will rise more for certain things 
than for others however abundant the money may be. "" Cantillon clearly acknowledged 
' Ibid. . 301 
Lanlillon Riclrmd, I. :. ssnr Srrr I o Vnrore Drr r 'rrrrrmeec I: n trenerel, Higgs translation (London. 
that the demand for goods may be affected by changes in the price level, supposing 
relative prices remain constant. Hume also realized that it would require time for changes 
in the price level to reach across all markets. Therefore, it is clear that many of the 
classicals were well-versed in a stronger understanding of money than Lange gives them 
credit. 
Cantillon is an important subsequent predecessor to contributors to economic 
theory, and he specifically emphasizes concepts — entrepreneurs, consumers, a 
microeconomic view of money and the economy, and even a structural foundation for 
Say's Law- that set the stage for Say 
Macmillan 1931), 179 
13 
IV. Pierre-Paul Mercier de la Riviere 
A strong deferder of property rights and free trade, French Physiocrat Pierre-Paul 
Mercier de la Riviere (1720-1793) anticipates Say's Law in several passages of his The 
Nature and Essential Order of Political Societies (1767). 
While arguing that the greatest happiness of a society consists in "the greatest 
possible abundance of useful goods and in the greatest possible liberty to make use of 
these goods, " he afftrms his support of property rights as the best means of securing the 
greatest happiness The greatest happiness for individuals is equal to that of the 
commun!ty, i. e, "what secures tfte best possible state of affairs for the communtty 
procures also the same advantage for each individual member of society "" 
Riviere undoubtedly states a version of Say's Law of during a discussion of trade 
and money 
Everybody is a buyer only to the exlenl. to which he is a seller, and since buying is 
paying, the buyer can do so only to the extent that he sells, because it is only by 
selling that he is able to obtain!he money to pay for what he buys From the fact 
that every buyer must be a seller and can buy only insofar as he sells, a further 
conclusion follows: namely, that every seHer must be also a buyer and can sell 
only insofar as he buys, and that each seller must through his purchases provide 
others with the money to buy the commodities which he intends to sell them 
" 
Riviere's first phrase, "everybody is a buyer only to the extent to which he is a seHer, " is a 
very basic version of Say's Lavv reduced to its simplest form. While Riviere is perhaps 
s Rtvtcre. pterre-paul Merc&et de la, The Vumr&rt nn J Lsse»t&ul Or&1er oj pr&I&neat h&&&met&as, quoted in 
Pbill&p C Ncsvman c! al, . '&'&&«rce Re«&in&gs n& To&urn&n&c "hough h 1 N evv York W. W Norton and 
Company. 1934) 103. 
' 
Ib&d ' Ibid. , 105 
too simplistic, he grasps the basic notion of Say's Law, particularly in a rudimentary 
scenario. 
The key idea to Say's Law — and suggested by Riviere — is the emphasis on a 
system-wide phenomenon rather than market by market, yet he correctly follows an 
analysis based upon individual phenomenongrst and then adding up the effect in the 
aggregate Riviere's treatment is not flawless, however; for instance, he nearly suggests 
the Keynesian misunderstanding that spending — — not production — is the source of wealth 
when he argues that sellers "provide others with the money to buy. commodities". 
Riviere is unclear as to whom "others'" may be, and so does not provide a suflicient 
explanation If he means that sellers must first produce (or own sellable products), and in 
the selling process, he exchanges with other sellers, who then use the cash to purchase 
other commodities, than he is correct AVhat exactly he means is unclear Further, he 
doesn't make a logical argument as to th» causal relationship (he. , whether it is 
production or consumption which initiates this symbiotic relationship) However, he is 
clearly tying together the activities of buying and selling as necessarily interdependent 
Though it requires a more sophisticated argument to clarify what Riviere intends to 
prove, one thing is clear Riviere hints at Sav's Law and foreshadows the controversy that 
will surround it. 
14 
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the Keynesian misunderstanding that spending — not production — is the source of wealth 
when he argues that sellers "provide others with the money to buy. . commodities'* 
Riviere is unclear as to whom "others" may be, and so does not provide a sufficient 
explanation If he means that sellers must first produce (or own sellable products), and in 
the selling process, he exchanges with other seflers, who then use the cash to purchase 
other commodities, than he is correct What exactly he means is unclear. Further, he 
doesn't make a logical argument as to the causal relationship (i. e, whether it is 
production or consumption which initiates this symbiotic relationship) However, he is 
clearly tying together the activities of buying and selling as necessarily interdependent. 
Though it requires a more sophisticated argument to clarify what Riviere intends to 
prove, one thing is clear. Riviere hints at Say's Law and foreshadows the controversy that 
will surround it. 
V. Aun Robert Jacques Turgot 
Ann Robert Jacques Turgot (1727-1781) is associated with the Physiocrats though he 
was ultimately independent and subscribed to no single school of thought. Murrary 
Rothbard and others have remarked on Turgot's influence on Smith and Say, and 
Rothbard even goes so far as to argue that Say borrowed extensively from Turgot but 
neglected to cite Turgot due to the volatile political times, where quoting outsiders' 
views could lead to grave consequences Joseph Spengler remarks that "Turgot had 
implicitly denied that . . unemployment would persist so long as interoccupational 
movement was possible, thus anticipating Say's law. " 29 
Rothbard describes Turgot's clarity and understanding in a passage on Turgot's 
contributions to Say's Law: 
In his scintillating comments on the paper by Saint-Peravy, Turgot expanded his 
analysis of savings and capital to set forth an excellent anticipation of Says Law. 
Turgot rebutted pre-Keynesian fears of the physiocrats that money not spent on 
consumption would "leak" out of the circular flow and thereby wreck the 
economy. As a result, the physiocrats tended to oppose savings per se Turgot, 
however, pointed out that advances of capital are vital in all enterprises, and 
where might the advances come from, if not out of savings" He also noted that it 
made no difference if such savings wver e s uplli ed byl anded p opi et rs or by 
entrepreneurs. For entrepreneurial savings to be large enough to accumulate 
capital and expand production, profits have to be higher than the amount required 
to merely maintain the current capital stock. 
Turgot goes on to point out that the physiocrats assume without proof that 
savings simply leak out of circulation Instead, he says, money will return to 
circulation immediately, savings will be used either (a) to buy land, (b) to be 
invested as advances to workers and other factors, or (c) to be loaned out at 
' Spct&g(ar. Joseph J. . t phc pl&ysiocra!s aad Say's Law of Markets 11, " The Journal t&f political 
Fc&n&t&my, 53(4). (Dec 1945k 319 
interest. All of these uses of savings return money to the circular flow. Advances 
of capital, for example, return to circulation in paying for equipment, buildings, 
raw materials, or wages. The purchase of land transfers money to the seller of 
land, who in turn will either buy something with the money, pay his debts, or re- 
lend the amount. In any case, the money returns promptly to circulation. " 
Turgot overcomes the concern by Physiocrats, and later, Keynes, that saving results in a 
outflow of money which leaves the market process and potentially causes serious 
stagnation in consumption. Turgot's careful argument creates what is considered to be a 
genuine version of Say's Law. Turgot demonstrates that several of the classical 
economists had a sophisticated understanding of the market process. 
" Rotbbard, Murray. "A R I Turgol Brief. Lucid. and Bnlliant" from I'ryieen Great. 1asrrrun 
Economrsr», ed Randall G Holcombe (Ludrug von Mrses Institute. Auburn. I 999k 37-8. 
VL Adam Smith 
Say regarded Adam Smith (1723-1790) as an important contributor to economic 
thought, but he also realized that his contemporary often stumbled on matters of great 
economic importance. Smith's attempt to systematically create a comprehensive analysis 
of markets in his W'ealrh of Nations produced many failings in analysis. Smith, for 
example, focused on producti i&e and unproductive labor (which is an invidious distinction 
between the production of goods and services), and he had multiple wage theories, never 
fully comprehending which one was accurate. The key tlaws in Smithian thought revolve 
around his neglect of consumers and subjective value in favor of emphasizing a cost or 
supply side theory of market prices. 
Despite Smith's shortcomings in analysis and his weakness as a rigorous 
technician, his pre-Say contributions to Say's Law primarily his discussion on the role 
of saving — remain significant to the analysis of the evolution of Say's Law Further, as 
Murray Rothbard concludes, Say and Smith are crucial figures in their economic 
approaches; it is from the tradition of Smith that Milton Friedman, Irving Fisher and 
others have arisen, while the Austrian School is markedly the offspring of Say" While 
the originator of the Austrian School is commonly thought to be Carl Menger, Rothbard 
illustrates how Say contributed to the distinct continental tradition which branched away 
from British thought 
" Mark Thornton regards lush economist Richard Cautillon (1680-17341 as the forgotten father of 
economics aud emphasized Cautdlou as the most prominent precursor to Austnaa ecououucs in an cssai 
entitled "Ricluird Canullou: The Origin of Fcouomic Theory" 1'ouad iu id ( ren(. J asirma 1':zunomutu 
cd R;uidall G Holcombe, it. uduig vou Miscs lusiituie Auburn, AL. 1999). I A 
Smith's pi'ealth of Nations had been published almost 30 years before Say 
published the first edition of his own Treatise. Many mistakenly regard Say as merely a 
noted follower of Smith and as a primary promoter of Smithian thought, with few solid 
contributions of his own. Say remarked that "I revere Adam Smith, — he is my master, " 
though this was more political convenience (Say could not invoke the name of Turgot for 
political reasons) than a genuine admission of following the footsteps of Smith. ' Indeed, 
Say is not merely a French version of Smith, while they are certainly intellectual allies on 
economic policy, the two have distinct approaches and separate contributions to 
economic science. "Although Say has been best known as the man who systematized 
Adam Smith's concepts and introduced them to French readers, he was more than a mere 
popularizer. . he became the founder of a school of his own, the liberal-optimistic 
school "' 
Smith never directly addresses general gluts, but he makes contributions with 
implications favoring Say's view His understanding of the market process suggests that 
he would have perceived the 'invisible hand" as a self-correcting method of overcoming 
gluts within single markets, if not economy-wide His insightful passage on saving, 
quoted below, is a firm refutation of Keynesian distrust of saving as a "leakage" from the 
spending stream, and hence a depressant on aggregate demand. 
Say. Jcuu Bupnslc l I S21J. t. etter» to hir. Aiolthus on Severol, h'uhiect» of political Lieonon&v ond on 
th» Con»e of the Stognotion of Cr&n&n&cree, Trans)»(cd by J. R&cbier. (London Shet»vood. Ncely, aud 
Jones). Rcpnuicd (Ncu York Augustus M. Kelly, 19n&7) . 17 
" Neu suan, Pluhp C. , Arthur D Gayer, and Milton H Spencer, go»ere Reorhng» in Kr r&nriortc Thr&ught, 
(Nerr York: W W Norton, )954), 157, 
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The foundation for Say's Law depends upon sound economic theory. Smith, 
noted for his strong treatment of the division of labor and specialization, points out the 
relation between production and consumption whereby producers sefl whatever they have 
produced after direct consumption (i. e. , a wheat farmer brings to market the wheat which 
he himself has not consumed). " 
Smith argues extensively for economic growth based upon capital and saving, an 
example of his emphasis on the production- or supply-side. His passage about parsimony, 
or saving, clarifies saving as "the immediate cause of the increase of capital. " Saving is 
defined as a fluid commodity which, instead of satisfying immediate consumption needs, 
is invested and committed to some kind of production, generally in the form of capital. 
Saving is usually transferred to investors, who in turn commit resources as inputs, which 
increases the flow of production and total revenues, provided output is priced to sell 
One of the highlights of Smith's insight into human economic behavior manifests itself in 
the following passage 
Parsimony, by increasing the fund which is destined for the maintenance of 
productive hands, tends to increase the number of those hands whose labour adds 
to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed. It tends therefore to 
increase the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour of 
the country. It puts into motion an additional quantity of industry, which gives an 
additional value to annual produce ' 
It is not entirely clear whether Smith is referring to a positive effect of saving on an 
overall aggregate employment effect or lo simply the productivity of labor Smith fails to 
" This is suggestive of Walrasian excess demand cartes Walras attacked Alfred Marshall for his 
separauon of demand and suppll cuncs. 
20 
clarify the effects of saving on labor, and speaks in terms of aggregates, thereby 
sometimes losing the important microeconomic principles underlying the effects. He goes 
on, however, to almost directly refute the Keynesian assault on saving as a "leakage" for 
aggregate spending: 
What is annually saved is as regularly consumed as what is annually spent, and 
nearly in the same time too; but it is consumed by a different set of people. That 
portion of his revenue which a rich man annually spends, is in most cases 
consumed by idle guests and menial servants, who leave nothing behind them in 
return for their consumption. That portion which he annually saves, as for the 
sake of the profit it is immediately employed as a capital, is consumed in the same 
manner, and nearly in the same time too, but by a different set of people, by 
labourers, manufacturers and artificers, who reproduce with a profit the value of 
&6 their annual consumption 
In order to have investors, suggests Smith, you first need savers (defined as those 
who abstain from current consumption). Saving is seen as the allocation of resources, 
rather than a decline in full employment and income Hence, saving doesn*t cause mal- 
investment (defined as excessive investment due to improper signals to investors, namely 
resulting from faulty interest rates) because consumers are getting what they want, and no 
' Smith. Adam [177&)h In Inquiry into the Vature and Ca~ses oj the kreahh of&pat&one, quoted in 
Plull&p C. Ne&innan, et al, . Source Iteadmgs ti& Economic Thought, . &21 
' Ibid, 321-2. Th&s &s a direct refutauon of Keynes' distrust of saving where he wntes ". IU)p to thc 
point &vhere full employment prevails, the growth ol'capital depends not at all on a low propensity to 
consume but &s. on ihc contrary, held back by &t; and only in conditions ol' I'ull employn&ent is a low 
propensity io consume conduc&ve to the gro&vth of capital Morcovcr, cxpenence suggests tlmt in existing 
contht&ons savmgs by mstitutions and through sinking Iunds is more than adequate. and that measure for 
the redistnbution of incomes in a &va) hkcly io raise the propensity to consume inay prove positnelv 
fa& our &btc to thc growrth of capital. " (Key nes, I M. The C)enerat Theory of Employment, Iniere st and 
hhmev. (Ne&v York, Harcourt. Brace &&2 Co, 1958), 372-3 ). Ke) nes erroneously suggests m tlus passage 
Ihat no lradc-olf occurs between consumption and investment li is poss&ble that Keynes' distrust of 
sa& ing denves from the Calvinist tradition &vhich perhaps excessively advocates tlnift and samng at all 
tnncs. in contrast with thc Conunenial embrace of consummg;md 'In ing hfe fully" The Ncoclasstcals 
m&d Austrians see a trade-off bet&veen current and fu&ure consumpt&on (or sliort-run and long-nin 
consumption) even with a rate of return of acro. In contrast, thc Keynesian paradox tr&cs to do av&ay &vith 
the apparent trade-off 
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"mismatch" occurs. Smith focuses on the role of producers as creators of wealth — or as 
Say would say, creators of value. Say uses a nearly identical argument in his chapter 
entitled "On Production" in his Treatise. Further, Smith perceives investment as current 
resource use (consumption) to form capital by 'a de'erent set of people' than the savers. 
Importantly, saving is a good activity according to Smith, as it raises economic 
productivity, increases employment, and economic growth. In contrast, Keynes notably 
muddled the tie between saving necessarily being put into investment (at times arguing 
that savings must always equal investment, whereas at others, arguing that there tends to 
be an excess of saving and investment), thereby confusing saving with hoarding of 
purchasing power (money). Ultimately, this and similar errors led him to focus on 37 
artificial creation of demand and consumption, as well as a false representation of Say's 
Law as an assertion that business recessions were impossible 
Say counters Kevnes' concern . then he antes in a lootnote that "eten when money is obtained anth a 
vtevv to hoard or but y n, the ulti!nate ob)ect is ahvays to employ it in a purchase of some kind, The heir 
of the luck) finder uses it m that ivay, if the ni!ser do not" Monei ) iclds services wlulc ui mtenlory. lor 
savmgs are sunply assets not available for immediate usc m ihc short-run (Say, Jean-Baptistc. l1821). 
7ber&r&srs Translated by C. R Prinscp (Philadr. lplua. Claxtoii Remsen &1& HalTcllmgcr, 1881), Repruited. 
(Nevv York. Augustus M. Kelley, 1971). 188 ) 
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VIL Jean-Baptiste Say 
Jean-Baptiste Say (1767-1832) published the first edition of his major work the 
Treatise on Political Economy in 1803; however, it is his fourth edition, published in 
1821, which has been translated fltlly into English and which is most oflen quoted. ' 
Considerable changes were made between his firsi and fourth editions, extending to such 
great lengths that some chapters were completely rewritten while entirely new chapters 
were added. Between the publication of his first and second edition (published in I 814), 
James Mill (1773-1836) published his impoitant contribution to t!ie general glut 
controversy, entitled ('ommerce Defended (1808). Some argue that Say's Law was 
scarcely present in Say's first edition, and that ii wasn't until after Mill's treatment of the 
general glut controversy that Say clarified his own arguments. Rothbard, in contrast, 
emphasizes the possibility that neither Say nor Mill regarded themselves as making any 
great contribution or discovery, but rather, merely asserting a very obvious axiom in 
economics. That is, neither took credit as the '"founder" of the "doctrine" because it 
appeared to each of them as an absolute fundamental, a nearly obvious given in economic 
science. It is likely that both read each other's writings on the subject, and influenced 
each other in some respects, but their approaches were distinct. 
Say introduces the topic of gluts — or recessions by remarking that it is oflen 
heard by sellers of various goods and services that 'their ditliculty [in selling their 
product] lies not in production, but in the disposal of commodities; that produce would 
23 
always be abundant, if there were but a ready demand. "' He goes on, observing that 
"ask them what peculiar causes and circumstances facilitate the demand for their 
products, and you wiII soon perceive that most of them have extremely vague notions of 
these matters. "" 
Say tells the reader that his goal is to refute false beliefs held by the general public 
related to the causes (and cures) of "gluts, " or in modern language, recessions and 
depressions. That is, gluts are defined as periods of low employment, output, and 
income. He points out that during times of economic hardship, notably during recessions, 
serious doubts arise about the ability. for markets to self-correct Further, he observes 
that it is nearly inevitable that the business community will cry for some cure of the 
(short-term) recession In a period of crises, people complain that they do not have 
enough money to spend. Say realizes this complaint is superficial and that the real 
problem is that not enough goods have been successfully produced and sold, resulting in 
the supply side causing a general crisis This point is critical for it demonstrates that 
crises occur due to underproduction (low income) rather than underconsumption. Say 41 
suggests that the temptation to insist upon a governmental cure without identifying the 
canxe of the problem leads to (government) solutions "of the most mischievous 
tendency ' He argues that we are led to a conclusion about the nature and causes of gluts 
" Tlie author inll bc quoting from the fourth edition unless otltcrwisc noted 
Say. . l. B Saic [1821], Trearue, Translated bl C R Prinsep. [Philadelphia Claaion. Remsen 2Z 
Haffelfinger 1881), Reprinted. (Nein York. Augustus M, Kelter, 1971k 132 
' ' Ibid, 132 
" On March 29, 2001 the ctnef cconoimsi I'or Chase argued on CNBC thai Ihe nnportant tlniig is 
income tf thai holds up, Ihcn consumption spenduig will bc linc. This understanding of markets is 
prcscni m Saic s writngs. 
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"that may at first sight appear paradoxical; viz. that it is production which opens a 
demand for products. "' This is perhaps the closest that Say gets to stating Keynes' 
parody that "supply creates its own demand. " Say isn't stating that a supply of plums 
creates a demand for plums, but rather, that it is only through supply of plums (priced for 
sale) that the ability to purchase non-plums can potentially occur. " More accurately, to 
demand, you must supply. That is, consumers must have purchasing power (income) 
acquired through prior production 
Say does not appear to argue that supply is the necessary and sut%cient condition 
for demand -it is only the necessary condition because buyers need means for exchange 
and this means money comes from prior sales. He points out that "the mere circumstance 
of the creation of one product [priced for sale] immediately opens a vent for other 
products. "' Say's use of term 'vent" here most likely means the porentictl for demand, 
as opposed to actual demand lf so, then Keynes' suggestion that Say's Law implies an 
automatic "creation" of demand is a misleading caricature of Say's meaning, Say 
contends that supply occurs because indiiiidua!s want to demand — to purchase goods and 
services in the short-run or long-run. Say is not neglecting the demand side, as suggested 
by Keynes, but rather, is emphasizing the crucial role of the supply side in creating 
recessions. He is essentially pointing out the cause of such crises, which simply happens 
to be that of the supply side 
IbKI 
This example of the pluras cau bc I'ouud ta II H Bait In Ecoaoauu(iir the Long Rim. ed Morgan 0 
Reynolds. (C1»cage: CTatcway Editions 1986). 12-13 
" Ibid 13-1-135 
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Say then clarifies the role of money, which he defines as primarily "the agent of 
the transfer of values. Its whole utility has consisted in conveying to your hands the 
values of the commodities, which your customer has sold, for the purpose of buying again 
from you; and the very next purchase you make, it will again convey to a third person the 
values of the products you may have sold to others. "" Say carefully includes money in 
this passage because people often attribute economic gluts to a scarcity of money; sales, 
he says, 'cannot be said to be dull because money is scarce, but because other products 
»46 
are so 
" 
Say's belief that scarcity of money cannot be the cause of recessions his highly 
arguable. Monetary malfunctions are an obvious correlate of business cycles, so it is clear 
that Say is considering money without the potential for monetary glitches. Say writes, 
"there is always money enough to conduct the circulation and mutual interchange of other 
values, when those values really exist. Should the increase of traffic require more money 
to facilitate it, the want is easily supplied, and is a strong indication of prosperity '* Say »47 
severely misunderstands money here. He relies on Hume's notion that money is simply a 
veil, and in doing so, neglects Walras' Law and Pigou's real balance effect (defined as an 
imbalance in quantity supplied and quantity demanded for money). Say falters here on 
the "optimal quantity of money theory" and misses the point that any amount of money, 
which must be a scarce good to remain money, is efficient as long as prices are flexible. 
With fltd 0 e p. i &us, lov money supply causes harm only if an unpredictable collapse in 
' Ibid. , ISS. 
"Ibid. 13-I. 
the money supply has occurred. Unpredictable fluctuations in quantity of money have 
major economic costs, especiafly in redistributing wealth between lenders and borrowers. 
That individuals value stability and low variability in the exchange value of money is a 
widely acknowledged virtue or asset. While such incidents have adverse effects, the act 
of decreasing money supply per se is not necessarily harmful. 
Say emphasizes interdependence across markets, suggesting that the prosperity of 
one benefits others. Exchange is not a zero-sum game, but a mutually beneficial act for 
those parties involved "The success of one branch of commerce supplies more ample 
means of purchase, and consequently opens a market for the products of all the other 
branches, on the other hand, the stagnation of one channel of manufacture, or of 
commerce, is felt in all the rest. " ' Here Say highlights the importance of production (and 
hence, supply) as Smith and Riviere did before him. If the agricultural sector harvests 
well one year, this higher income allows producers of agricultural goods to buy more 
non-agricultural goods Likewise, a poor yield means that farmers can purchase, for 
example, fewer manufactured goods. Importantly, this example implies that a glut of 
manufactured goods can occur due to a shortfall in agricultural goods, the problem, as 
Say sees it, is that the agricultural market for whatever reason — has produced too little, 
leading to an imbalance in vahies of goods in each respective market, this becomes 
obvious because of the higher market price for agricultural goods and the lower market 
Ibid 
" Ibid 135 
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price for manufactured goods (assuming price flexibility). Fewer purchases of 
manufactured goods follow from a reduction in agricultural income. 
Say addresses the criticism that there empirically sometimes exist a large glut of 
commodities "all around", a fact which appears to counter his argument. He replies that 
"the glut of a particular commodity arises from its having outrun the total demand for it in 
one of two ways: either because it has been produced in excessive abundance, or because 
the produce of other commodities has fallen short. " lt is entirely possible for 
entrepreneurs to miscalculate the appropriate amount to produce, as individuals have 
imperfect predictive powers and willingly accept risks involved with producing a product 
If sellers produce too much of a good, the market price adjusts by falling. If the price 
falls low enough, marginal sellers discontinue production of the good. Hence, an error in 
production is remedied by market adjustment in price, the problem is short-run and 
corrected by market processes. If an economy-wide recession occurs due to the declining 
production of other goods, then, writes Say somewhat inadequately, "people have bought 
less, because they have made less profit, and they have made less profit for one of two 
reasons; either they have found difficulties in the employment of their productive means, 
or these means have themselves been deficient "'" However, Say correctly points at some 
kind of hindrance to proper coordination. Though Say may not properly identify the 
correct hindrance, he is on the right track 
Ibid 135. 
' Ibid, 1 is 
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Say anticipates the phenomenon of Walras' Law, but it is important to note that 
while Say did not really understand Walras' Law, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) did. 
Broadly defined, Walras' Law is an adding up or accounting proposition which says that 
a closed system must obey certain aggregate constraints. Therefore, Walras' Law deals 
with the summation of all individual budget constraints. In particular, if N- I markets 
experience aggregate negative excess demand (" glut" ), then the Nth market must have 
aggregate positive excess demand ("shortage") of equal money value because the 
aggregate sum of excess demands across all individual markets always equal zero. 
Implicitly, then, aggregate supply equals aggregate demand under Walras' Law, though 
depression is possible despite built-in corrective pressures. 
The focus of Say's chapter then highlights the implications of what he has 
carefully argued for the first half of the chapter, IJe deduces that all purchases are the 
result of someone having produced something of value; even a welfare recipient, who 
himself never works a day in his life, consumes in place of the person who actually 
produced the value which allow the goods to be purchased. Yet Say, after concluding 
that general gluts can occur, ends the chapter with a vague explanation directed at the 
misguided errors of governmental administration. Hence, Say ends on a weak note rather 
than fully and rigorously defending his position He is far too vague and opens real 
opportunity for criticism 
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VIII. James Mill 
James Mill (1773-1836) is a noted philosopher, historian and economist, and the 
father of John Stuart Mill. He is regarded by some as the co-founder of the law of 
markets, for he addressed the general glut controversy during the same period as Say, and 
argues perhaps even more intensely for "Say's" Law. His two greatest contributions to 
economics are his Conmterce Defended (1808) and Elements of Political Econonry 
(1821) Say had virtually no section on "Say's Law" in the first edition of his Treatise, 
and only included his formal arguments for Say's Law in a later edition, after the 
publication of Mill's Commerce Defended It is for this reason that some regard 
t onrmerce Defended as the original source for Say's Law, and accordingly, it should 
really be "Mill's Law. " 
While Mill*s perspective is often lucid and well-reasoned, he also tends to 
exaggerate the case 1'or the inability of &iluts to occur, and in doing so, adopts a view 
against the existence of gluts. 
James Mill described the role of production as "the one and universal cause which 
creates a market For the commodities produced. " He explains that "if a nation's power of 
purchasing is exactly measured by its annual produce, as it undoubtedly is; the more you 
increase the annual produce, the more by that very act you extend the national market, 
the power of purchasing and the actual purchases of the nation **" A key to individual 
purchasing power is the necessary condition that products must be priced for sale; if this 
' Mill. James, [1808k Conuneree Defsnided, (New York: Autmstus M. Ketley. 1965), 81 
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is so, then production equals income (or purchasing power). Mill highlights the temporal 
order of events such that production leads to an increase in what he calls purchasing 
power, a necessary condition for demand to exist (though not sufficient — one must also 
be willing to demand). However, we can hardly exaggerate the explicit role of prices in 
the market process, and Mill tends to neglect prices as an explicit factor in the discussion. 
Mill argues that "whatever be the additional quantity of goods therefore which is 
at any time created in any country, an additional power of purchasing, exactly equivalent, 
is at the same instant created; so that a nation can never be naturally overstocked with 
capital or with commodities "" Mill boldly asserts this without recognizing the possibility 
for gluts (excessive prices). Intertemporal hitches to the economy may prevent short-run 
equilibrium, but investment, though long-term, involves the creation of capital that aids in 
both short-run and long-run production Production priced for sale creates new income 
for subsequent (new) demand. Further, Mill declares that a nation can never "naturally*' 
be overstocked, implying that such phenomena are caused by something other than 
aggregate overproduction and under-consumption. Reiterating the point, Mill says that 
"the whole of the goods will be exchanged, the one half against the other, and the market 
will always be equal to the supply Thus, it appears that the demand of a nation is always 
equal to the produce of a nation. . The extend of its supply are always exactly 
commensurate. "' However, these strong claims are open to criticism by even allies of 
Ibid 
'-' Ibid II3 
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Mill, for his exuberance over his point disallows a more realistic view of possible 
scenarios. His analysis is too strong here, and thus falters. 
In accord with Say's assertions as to the nature and causes of gluts, should they 
occur, Mill remarks that "the quantity of any one commodity may easily be carried 
beyond its due proportion; but by that very circulation is implied that some other 
commodity is not provided in sulficient proportion. "" Mill reveals the generally 
microeconomic analysis of the classical economists, who address even aggregate market 
conditions in terms of microeconomics. Perhaps more important, though, is his 
realization that interdependence between markets results in reactions to over- or 
undersupply. If a good experiences oversupply, then some other good experiences a 
similar reaction through undersupply. The more complex the market as a whole, the less 
obvious this relationship may become. Yet the relationship maintains existence, 
according to some (including Mill) 
Later, Mi!1 addresses the potential for "demand deficiency" when he notes that 
The Econom'istes and their disciples express great apprehension lest capital should 
increase too fast, lest the production of commodities should be too rapid. There 
is only, say they, a market for a given quantity of commodities, and if you increase 
the supply beyond that quantity you will be unable to dispose of the surplus " 
Mill addresses the fear of those who argue that suppliers may produce too many goods, 
thereby leaving large amounts of unsold output. Once again, the role of prices appears to 
be the primary cause of misunderstanding about such an occurrence. Fundamental 
market laws of supply and demand predict that a surplus on the supply side v, ill, through 
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the market process and some unknown period of time, result in prices declining until 
markets clear 
In James Mill's Elements of Political Economy, Mill frequently parallels Say's 
arguments on market behavior. Mill refers to "that supply upon which the consumption 
depends. "' Further, he makes the distinction between individual markets and the 
aggregate, a signiftcant point to understand when analyzing the existence (or lack) of 
Say's Law. "In speaking here of demand and supply, it is evident that we speak of 
aggregates, '* Mill says. "When we say of any particular nation, at any particular time, that 
its supply is equal to its demand, we do not mean in any one commodity, or any two 
commodities We mean, that the amount of its demand, in all commodities taken 
together, is equal to the amount of its supply in all commodities taken together. " To view 
the market in terms of aggregate supply versus aggregate demand may not be the most 
useful approach (as some critics, such as I. eland Yeager, have noted), but the underlying 
concept is a state of general equilibrium in the aggi egate. 
While Mill argues for an equality between aggregate dentand and aggregate 
supply, he ignores the integral role of prices and the price level Mill remarks that "it may 
very well happen, notwithstanding this equality in the general sum of demands and 
supplies, that some one commodity or commodities may have been produced in a quantity 
either above or below the demand for those particular commodities "' Me concludes that 
"whatever, therefore, be the amount of the annual produce, it never can exceed the 
' Mill. Ja&ucs, l1 g44J, Lle»&e»u uf Pr&l&r&eul Fr us»&uv . &" ed (New York. Augusl M. KeHey. 1963k 2. 
' Ib&d. 230, 
33 
amount of the annual demand. "" Mill seems unaware of any problems of pricing and 
aggregation. 
Arguing that every producer comes to the market with the ultimate intention of 
consuming sooner or later, Mill echoes the words of Say on the very intent of a producer 
to enter the market. Importantly, Mill acknowledges that one might enter the market 
with a demand for a certain commodity which no one has found profitable or desirable to 
produce. Herein lies one of the several possible reasons for underproduction in a given 
market Writes Mill, 'Though it be undeniable, that the demand, which every man brings, 
is equal to the supply, which he brings, he may not find in the market the sort of 
purchaser, which he wants No man may have come desiring that sort of commodity, of 
which he has to dispose lt is not the less necessarily true, that he came with a demand 
equal to his supply, for he wanted something in return for the goods which he brought 
"" 
He continues, arguing at the microeconomic level, that every individual has a market 
demand equal to his own market supply. Since demano is both the willingness and ability 
(purchasing power) to buy a good or service at a market price, it makes obvious sense 
that this ability, and thus demand, derives from an individual providing or supplying a 
good or service. From this logic, Mill concludes that "every man [has] a demand and a 
supply. , both equal; if any commodity be in greater quantity than the demand, some other 
commodity must be in less. "" 
'" 
Ib&d . 232 
Ibid. 233 
"' Ibid. 235. 
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Mill then addresses a situation when one commodity exists in superabundance 
while another exists in shortage. 
The commodity, which happens in superabundance, declines in price; the 
commodity, which is defective in quantity, rises [in price]. This is the fluctuation 
of the market, which every body suAiciently understands. The lowness of the 
price, in the article which is superabundant, soon removes, by the diminution of 
profits, a portion of capital from that line of production; The highness of price, in 
the article which is scarce, invites a quantity of capital to that branch of 
production, till profits are equalized, that is, till the demand and supply are 
adapted to one another. "' 
Mill's treatment is misleading when he writes about 'the article which is scarce, ' for all 
economic goods are inherently scarce, he is referring to a good experiencing shortage, 
despite his imprecise use of terminology Wb!le he neglected the role of prices previously, 
he now emphasizes their etfect in correcting niarkets experiencing gluts or shortages He 
seems to accept the condition of a partial glut corrected by price reductions, Mill does not 
deny the possible existence of superabundance in a given market. Yet he fails to address 
the diA'erence between a market or partial glut, which he concedes can exist, and a 
general aggregate glut, which he argues is impossible His argument suAers because he 
does not recognize that a general glut may occur if all markets but the inoney market are 
in superabundance He fails to clarify that the presence of money allows for a general 
glut in other goods and services 
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Mill lightly touches upon an issue which Keynes would later address: excessive 
saving (resulting from collapsed investment ex ante) that leads to depressed aggregate 
spending (demand). "The strongest case, which could be put, in favour of the supposition 
that produce may increase faster than consumption, " writes Mill, "would undoubtedly be 
that, in which, every man consuming nothing but necessaries, all the rest of the annual 
produce should be saved. This is, indeed, an impossible case, because it is inconsistent 
with the laws of human nature. "' Unfortunately, Mill abandoned a deep inquiry into this 
question and simply relied upon a weak justification that some unnamed "laws of nature" 
prevented this from occurring He may be referring to the empirical evidence 
demonstrating that mankind simply does not operate in that manner with subsistence 
spending only, but his reasoning did not clarify the issue one way or the other. He in 
effect ignores Say's simple lesson. why should one bother to add supply if there is no 
intent to augment consumption, or even future consumption (investment). He continues, 
saying that "it appears, therefore, by accumulated proof, that production can never be too 
rapid for demand Production is the cause, and the sole cause, of demand It never 
furnishes supply, without furnishing demand, both at the same time, and both to an equal 
extent. . The doctrine of the glut, therefore, seems to be disproved by reasoning perfectly 
conclusive " Mill understands the reciprocal nature of production and demand He 
seems to again provide a sketchy indication of Walrasian theory Mill's conclusions, 
Ibid. , 235-236 
' Ibid. 236. 
' Ibid. 237-240. 
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while "perfectly conclusive" to him, remain disputed and at the heart of a deep 
controversy in economics. 
It is possible that the law of markets could be justifiably called "Turgot's Law" or 
"Mill's Law" given their involvement in developing the concept. Mill plays a key role in 
advancing Say's Law, while his arguments differ from Say's substantially enough to 
observe his distinctive approach to the general glut controversy. 
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IX. Thomas Robert Malthns 
Known predominantly for his population theory, the Reverend Thomas Robert 
Malthus (1766-1834) was the leading classical critic of Say's law of markets. He devoted 
much of his academic effort toward refuting Ricardo's and Say's explanations of political 
economy and is often regarded as Keynes' predecessor, in part because Lord Keynes 
himself asserted as much. Malthus and Say conducted extensive exchanges over the 
explanation for general gluts Malthus' Principles of Poittical Economy (1820) is his 
most notable economic text, in which he formally makes his arguments against Say's 
Law Malthus presents his perception of the debate in the following manner 
It has been thought by some very able writers, that, although there may easily be a 
glut of particular commodities, there cannot possibly be a glut of commodities in 
general; because according to their own view of the subject, commodities being 
always exchanged for commodities, one half will always furnish a market for the 
other half, and production being thus the sole source of demand, an excess in the 
supply of one article merely proves a deficiency in the supply of some other, and a 
general excess is impossible M Say. has indeed gone so far as to state that the 
consumption of a commodity by taking it out of the market diminishes demand, 
and the production of a commodity proportionately increases it. . . This doctrine, 
however, as generally applied, appears to me to be utterly unfounded, and 
completely to contradict the great principles which regulate supply and 
demand ""' 
If one ignores the market for money, or suspends the reality of money's existence, then 
Malthus is correct in his first assertion However, Malthus' criticism of Say in his final 
sentence above is erroneous because consumption is the extermination of market value, 
and hence the end of the economic process This direct attack on Say, therefore, seems 
' Malthus. Thouras Robert, [1820k Prntetpies oj Puhrtcol i:r r&nnrny. quoted m Phillip C Neivmau. et al, 
, 4'oarce ReadntXs m 2:rononnc Thougltr, 177. 
to reveal a misunderstanding by Malthus on the role of consumption, since Say argues 
that consumption is the end and not the stimulus of commerce. 
" Because consumption is 
the ultimate end of exchange, once a product is fully consumed, i. e. , has fulfilled its 
ultimate purpose, it "has opened no new market, " says Say, "but just the reverse. " ' 
Additionally, Malthus describes the market in terms of "halves, " a rather faulty view of 
markets Supply and demand are not mutually exclusive halves of a pie; instead, they 
interact as duality in the market process Ultimately, a producer is also a consumer, and 
vice versa. Malthus defends his position by arguing that it is not necessarily true that 
commodities are exchanged for (other) commodities Malthus' argument reveals that he 
misunderstands the market process. Under a barter economy, exchange only occurs 
when goods are exchanged for other goods When commodity money is introduced, this 
principle still holds, even though the market becomes more complex and the act of 
exchange with money separates the direct exchange of economies However, exchanging 
goods and services for money results in an exchange between a good or service and 
money, which represents the possibility for the money-holder to defer the exchange 
between money and some other good or service. 
More important, however, is Malthus' argument favoring the potential for general 
gluts to occur Citing a case of increased production with (what he suggests is) constant 
or declining current demand, he writes that "a great increase of produce with 
comparatively stationary numbers or with wants diminished by parsimony, must 
6C li is uuporiani to recognize that consumer demand and consumption arc noi equal, they arc disuuci 
pnnciples. 
necessarily occasion a great fall of value estimated in labour, so that the same produce, 
though it might have cost the same quantity of labour as before, would no longer 
command the same quantity; and both the power of accumulation and the motive to 
accumuhte would be strongly checked. "" This passage almost hints at a primitive "real" 
business cycle theory. His analysis, while accurately implying that drops in production 
price imply input price declines, falters in terms of the entire picture. While Malthus 
addresses the appropriate problem, his diagnosis is incomplete and headed down the 
wrong path. 
In response to Ricardo, Malthus asks "when there may be an universal glut of 
commodities, how can it be maintained, as a general position, that capital is never 
redundant, and that because commodities may retain the same relative values, a glut can 
only be partial, not general"""" Malthus assumes that capital becomes "redundant" during 
downturns since net consumption declines. The problem is not that capital becomes 
redundant due to over-saving, but that some producers are not producing enough 
commodities priced to sell 
Malthus then addresses Ricardo's argument about a glut of capital, such as that 
found during a depression. Malthus quotes Ricardo's argument that "there is only one 
case, and that will be temporary, in which the accumulation of capital with a low price of 
food may be attended with a fall of profits, and that is, when the fund for the maintenance 
of labour increases much more rapidly than population, -wages will then be high and 
' SaJ, teart-Bapttstc 118211, Trearrae on Polrrrool Economy, Translated front 4'" ed 139 
' Malthus. Pmnrrplea of Voarrr ol Economv, 178. 
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profits low. " Ricardo alludes to the faulty classical notion that because corn and grain 
supply was restrained by a tariff food prices were high, thus resulting in (what they 
believed to be) an increase in subsistence wages. Ricardo continues, "if every man were 
to forego the use of luxuries and be intent only on accumulation, a quantity of necessaries 
might be produced for which there could not be any immediate consumption. " He 
identifies a coordination problem resulting from an intertemporal mismatch between 
production and consumption. Says Ricardo, "of commodities so limited in number, there 
might undoubtedly be an universal glut; and consequently there might neither be demand 
for an additional quantity of such commodities, nor profits on the employment of more 
capital lf men ceased to consume, they would cease to produce " Ricardo's »69 
concluding remark indirectly suggests Say's Law through understanding the integral role 
of consumer in initiating the production process 
Rhetorically, Malthus asks "but if, whenever this occurs, there may be an 
universal glut of commodities, how can it be maintained, as a general position, that capital 
is never redundant; and that because commodities may retain the same relative values, a 
glut can only be partial, not generalo"" Malthus correctly identifies a weakness but 
neither he nor Ricardo can point to the conditions providing for a glut, especially the 
assumed inflexibility of prices downward 
Expanding the argument further, Malthus concludes that "no nation can possrb1y 
grow rich by an accumulation of capital, arising from a permanent diminution of 
'" ibid, 179. 
"ibid (Malihus is quohug Ricardo beret 
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consumption. " This, of course, is preposterous, since capital enables higher future 
consumption. Here again, Malthus confuses the rnatter by ignoring its source. If 
consumption permanently declines — an absurd situation given that future consumption is 
deferred for a finite period — then the national savings rate increases as people increase 
capital investments. As capital stock rises, production increases (at least for sure in the 
short-run investment increases, and consumption increases in the long-run due to the 
capital increase). Malthus continues his reasoning, stating that "because such 
accumulation being beyond what is wanted in order to supply the effectual demand for 
produce, a part of it would very soon lose both its use and its value, and cease to possess 
the character of wealth "" Interestingly, Malthus proposes an over-investment theory 
rather than malinvestment as a "boom " He hints at a notion of malinvestment suggests 
the beginnings of a business cycle theory, particularly related to the Austrian School's 
view 
Ultimately, Malthus' arguments form the foundation for what will become 
Keynesian thought in some respects, while at times touching upon ideas related to the 
Austrians Malthus defines gluts in the first edition of 1'rincrples vf Political Aconomyas 
simply the condition where 'profits [decline] almost to nothing. '* Typically, there is a 
strong correlation between crises and small, zero, or even negative profits However, this 
phenomenon is an effect a symptom rather than a genuine cause or definition of gluts. 
Keynes expands upon Malthus' arguments against Say, or what he calls the classical 
'" Malllitts, Thomas Robert. Princ(VIes nf Vntnmat itconvmy. 179 
' Ibid. Ittl 
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fallacy, relying in large part on Malthusian thought according to Stephen Kates. 
" 
Keynes' reliance on Malthus in some sense seems to have harmed the integrity of Keynes' 
attack on Say for Malthus oflen exaggerated Say's position (who never denied that gluts 
can occur), and in doing so, may have influenced Keynes' understanding of Say himself. 
Many scholars have acknowledged that Keynes was not well-read, and may have, for 
instance, addressed what Malthus claimed Say argued, rather than researching Say's own 
arguments. 
In response to Malthus' intense criticisms and distortions of Say's meaning, Say 
replied with letters published as pamphlets. In a series of hve published letters, Say 
confronts the arguments set forth by Malthus, the flrst of which was devoted to proving 
that "produce is only bought with produce" It is not until the second letter that Say 
directly addresses Malthus' opposing view on the nature of gluts Since Say's case relies 
on a logical argument establishing the role of production, however, his first letter plays an 
important role in the overall debate "The only real consumers are those who produce on 
their part, " writes Say in the first letter, "because they alone can buy the produce of 
others, and that barren consumers can buy nothing except by the means of value created 
»7. 
by producers " ' Say regards barren customers as those who produce nothing but 
consume, such as children or welfare recipients. That is, exchange is a two-v ay process 
Katcs writes thai "It was reading Malthus' letters to Ricardo during the depths of thc Great Dcpressioii 
in late 1932 that crystallized [stc] in Keyncs' mind the important of effective demand. It s»as out ol' this 
lirsl acquain»ance iiith tlm lau of markets that the General 7lmor» would grot». 
" (Katcs, Stephen. . vn»'r 
I. uii aud the t e»neriuu Re& oiuiion. , (Edward Flgar. Clieltcnham, UK, 1998), I)0. ) 
' Ibid. . 5. 
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Say believes that the entire value of production is capable of being purchased (or 
borrowed against the anticipated production value) as long as no intertemporal problems 
arise. Stating a basic assumption, which Say's Law depends upon, Say asserts that 
individuals cannot be buyers without first having something to offer in exchange. '*It is 
therefore reaHy and absolutely with their produce that they make their purchases: 
therefore it is impossible for them to purchase any articles whatever, to a greater amount 
than those they have produced, either by themselves or through the means of their capital 
or their land " It is critical to understand that Say, like most of the classical economists, 
probably thought in terms of a one-period simple economy because they set aside 
complications, they made no formal distinction between one-period and multiple-period 
analysis. The classical economists did not formally address markets in this manner, but 
the lack of an overt distinction likely opened the door for the dynamic short-run analysis 
of Keynes At its core, Say's argument establishes a causal relationship in the 
marketplace, it provides a sound explanation as to why an individual enters the 
marketplace in the first place. To exchange implies the provision and trade of 
commodities or services by two parties (assume, for simplicity, a barter economy with a 
double-coincidence of wants) Therefore, one cannot enter the market without first 
possessing or producing a good or service, in a two-man world, no market exists unless 
both individuals produce (or at least possess) some economic good for exchange Even 
in a purely exchange economy without production, exchange can be productive and 
Say. JcanBapnsie, ( l821. Letter; ro 3 Jr Afar&ha» on 5'everal guhJecrs of' pohhccl Econonlv and on the 
C'naie orihe Strrgnnhon oj C'onnnerce, Translaicd by J Richter. (London Sheissood, Nccly, and Jones), 
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benefit both parties since possessing economic goods that others desire opens up the 
opportunity for mutually beneficial exchange. 
Addressing the logical argument behind Say's Law, Say writes that "as no one 
can purchase the produce of another except with his own produce, as the amount for 
which we can buy is equal to that which we can produce, the more we can produce the 
more we can purchase. . . That if certain commodities do not sell, it is because others are 
not produced, and that it is the raising produce alone which opens a market for the sale of 
produce " ' While Say is not incorrect, he neglects a possible source for commodities not 
selling overpricing. However, he is focusing on trnderproduction here due to some 
problem or hindrance, which might include pricing discrepancies 
While Malthus emphasizes the role of the consumer, Say argues that "the only real 
consumers are those who produce on their part because they alone can buy the produce 
of others, and that barren consumer can buy nothing except by the means of values 
created by producers. "" Hence, consumption purchases inherently rely upon production, 
without which they simply cannot occur in a production and exchange system Even 
"barren" (as Say calls them) consumers like welfare recipients or children consume 
because someone else has produced exchangeable goods or services This is an 
important issue because Kevnes supports stimulating consumer demand through 
government means, suggesting an underconsumptionist theory. In contrast, Say argues 
Reprinted. (Neir York Aubntstus M. Kelly, I967k 4 
Ibid, 4 
Ibid, S. 
'' Scc Gart Becker for more on the role ol'cluldren as a -consumer durable" whereby parents must do thc 
production to provide for the consumption of children 
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that we stimulate the economy when "we purchase commodities with productive services, 
and the greater portion of productive serve we employ, the more we can buy. "' 
Say points out what, ultimately, is the cause of aggregate wealth: "it is the 
capability of production, " he says, "which makes the difference between a country and a 
desert. And the more a country produces, the more it is advanced, the more populous it 
is, and is the better provided. " Say's ingenious remark reveals what makes the 
diff'erence between a poor and rich nation — not government or natural resources or even 
capital, but the capability for production itself. Clarifying his position regarding the 
superabundance of commodities in general, or in the aggregate, Say writes 
I have asserted that if there is an overstock, a superabundance of many kinds of 
goods, it is because other goods are not produced in sufficient quantity to be 
exchanged with the first. That if the producers of them could produce more, or 
others, the first would find the vent which now fails; in a word, that there is only 
too much produce of certain kinds because there is not enough of others. iitl 
Say's analysis is inadequate because he is not clear enough, nor does he rigorously 
overcome the objections to his unsubstantiated last remark above. While Say is not 
referring to money, a more sophisticated treatment would suggest that Walras' emphasis 
on money applies to Say's argument Say properly believes that an abundance of 
economic (i. e. , scarce) goods cannot be a problem He describes what a merchant who 
traveled to America might have encountered upon landing in (early) 1600s Clearly, with 
few or no settlers, a merchant v'ould find his products in "overabundance" because 
demand would be too low. Yet the problem was caused due to a lack of flourishing 
"Ibid. 13 
Ibid. 6 
producers (and accordingly, consumers) willing and able to exchange with the merchant. 
Modern New York does not suffer from an "overabundance" of goods, because it has 
flourishing consumers of every variety. While at first glance it appears that the problem 
in unsettled New York was that there were too many goods, i. e. , the merchant has 
overproduced for a market which appears to have little to no demand, the cause for this 
scenario is simple there are not enough different producers to create vigorous market 
demand 
Though Say may not completely understand his own argument, he then restates 
the implications of Say's Law — a glut is caused by underproduction in one or several 
markets, and not by under-consumption It is this point which Malthus and Sismondi 
aggressively attack. Say acknowledges Sismondi's own contribution on the debate, citing 
his well-written criticism of Say and Ricardo. Sismondi, as quoted by Say, writes that 
'The error into which [Say and Ricardo] have fallen is entirely owing to this false 
principle — that the production is the same thing as the revenue Mr Ricardo, 
according to M. Say, repeats and aflirms it. 'M Say has proved in the most 
satisfactory manner, ' says he, 'that there is no capital, however large, that cannot 
be employed, because the demand for produce is only bounded by production 
' 
No person produces but with the intention of consuming or selling the article he 
produces, and no one sells but with the intention ofbuying some other 
production, which may be of immediate use, or contribute to future 
production. Upon this principle, ' continues M. de. Sismondi, 'it becomes 
absolutely impossible to comprehend or explain the best demonstrated fact in all 
the history of commerce, viz the choaking up of markets. '"' 
Sismondi realizes the weakness in Ricardian thought where the role of prices, money and 
intertemporal coordination are neglected so that confusion arises over the difference 
'" Ibid, ni. 
" Ibid, 7 
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between production and revenue. Sismondi points out the flawed reasoning by Ricardo 
that leads toward a coinplete dismissal of factual historical economic periods of 
recessions. Say replies that "revenue only exists in proportion to the exchangeable value 
of the produce, and that it can only have that value in consequence of the demand for it, 
in the present state of society. "' This in part lays the groundwork for the future view by 
the Austrians that entrepreneurial willingness to pay (and take on risk) is determined by 
anticipated market price. 
Say, evoking allusions to Adam Smith's invisible hand, states that men produce to 
satisfy their own wants and desires. Content with his proof on the nature of production, 
Say then addresses the "one point" which he and Malthus disagree on in the 3' Section of 
the seventh chapter of Malthus' PrmcrpIesof Political L'conomy, namely, the fact that 
Malthus "persist[a] in maintaining that men can, putting all productions together, produce 
a quantity more than equal to their wants, and consequently that there will be no 
employ for a part of these productions that there may be a superabundance and glut of 
all kinds at the same time. "' Seeing the debate as over that point alone, Say endeavors 
to 
prove in the first place, that whatever be the quantity produced, and the 
consequent depreciation of its price, a quantity produced of one kind is always 
sutficient to enable the producer to acquire the quantity produced of another kind, 
and afler having proved that the possibility of acquiring exists, I must enquire how 
those productions which superabound give rise to wants to consume them 
" 
Ibid, I I 
"' Ibid. , I9. 
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Say's argument is somewhat oversimplified and at times unclear. He should replace his 
focus on quantity produced with revenue and expenditure, because what is important is 
the income earned from producing goods that someone else demands. 
Part of his answer lies in a question he poses. "What more shall I say than that we 
only sell to those who produce? Why are not articles of luxury sold to a farmer who likes 
to lead a rustic life?" To this he replies, "because he had rather be idle than produce 
wherewith to purchase them. " Elements within Say's Law indirectly derive from this 
simple truth, this lucid understanding of human action; it may be that leisure is preferred 
by luxuries. One cannot afford luxuries because one has not produced enough to warrant 
an exchange, or one may simply not desire luxuries at all. Concluding with passion, Say 
declares that "whatever be the cause that circumscribes production, whether the want of 
capital, of population, of diligence, or liberty, the effect in my mind is the same: the 
articles which are off'ered on the one hand are not sold because too few are produced on 
the other ""' While Say rightly observes one aspect of the cause of gluts, he ignores the 
very real aspect of overpricing that, temporarily, produce surpluses 
Perhaps most important of all, Say acknowledges the posstbtlityof a short-rttn 
ghtt. Contrary to the misleading ideological attacks by his critics, Say clearly concedes 
that gluts may occur. However, he perceives the quickness with which some may 
overreact to a glut, which is undoubtedly short-run in nature He writes that 
Although the evil [of gluts] is great, it may still seem greater than it is The 
commodities which superabound in the markets of the universe, may strike the eye 
by their mass, and alarm commerce by the depreciation of their price, and still be 
only a very small part of the commodities made and consumed of each kind, There 
is no warehouse that would not be very soon emptied, if every kind of production 
of the commodity contained in it was simultaneously to ease in afl parts of the 
world. „. It has been further remarked, that if the quantity sent in the slightest 
degree exceeds the want, it is sufficient to alter the price considerably. ' 
Finally emphasizing price flexibility after neglecting it for too long, Say turns his attention 
to the important role of prices. In doing so, he cites the key to markets adjusting under 
the condition of gluts — the ability to depreciate prices. It is this paragraph which 
dramatically summarizes the entire argument by those who favor Say's Law, for much of 
their analysis necessarily focuses upon non-fixed prices and the ability for prices to adjust. 
"' Ibid. 24. 
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X. David Ricardo 
David Ricardo (1772-1823) plays the role of ally to Say in the dispute over Say's Law, 
though Murrary Rothbard contends that John Stuart Mill "ghost wrote'* much of 
Ricardo's work. Several scholars contend that Ricardo's role in the debate over Say's 
Law is small because, while Ricardo implicitly accepted propositions leading to Say's 
Law, he was never a major advocate for it. However, as Stephen Kates argues, Ricardo 
is an important figure if for nothing more than the fact that his "correspondence with 
Malthus, first alerted Keynes to the issue of effective demand and Say's Law. " 
That Ricardo advocated Say's Law can be best demonstrated by his brief 
explanation that "Too much of a particular commodity may be produced, of which there 
may be such a glut in the market, as not to repay the capital expended on it, but this 
cannot be the case with respect to all commodities. "" All commodities can be in 
disequilibrium with the exception of money, though, according to Walras' Law. Ricardo 
does not suggest whether he considers money or not in this case. In a letter to Malthus, 
he also states Say's Law in his simplified version "Men err in their productions, there is 
no deficiency of demand. "" 
Kalcs. Stcphcr&, , S'ay's Lan aml the I'evnec&an Re& t&tut&on. ql. 
Ricardo, David, (1817k The Petnotples of Pohtical Leononiv and Taratton. , (Nen York 
Everyman). 292 
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In his oAen-quoted passage, Ricardo plainly supports the general notion of Say's 
Law. Further, he provides solid groundwork as a classical economist who played a key 
role as a supporter of Say's Law and its implications. 
M. Say has. . . most satisfactorily shown that there is no amount of capital which 
may not be employed in a country, because demand is only limited by production. 
No man produces but with a view to consume or sell, and he never sells but with 
an intention to purchase some other commodity, which may be immediately useful 
to him, or which may contribute to future production. By producing, then, he 
necessarily becomes either the consumer of his own goods, or the purchaser and 
consumer of the goods of some other person It is not to be supposed that he 
should, for a»y leng(A of time, be ill-informed of the commodities which he can 
most advantageously produce, to attain the object which he has in view, namely, 
the possession of other goods, and, therefore, it is not probably that he will 
coniinnally produce a commodity for which there is no demand. 
There cannot, then, be accumulated in a country any amount of capital which 
cannot be employed productively until wages rise so high in consequence of the 
rise of necessaries, and so little consequently remains for the profits of stock, that 
the motive for accumulation ceases. While the profits of stock are high, men will 
have a motive to accumulate. Whilst a man has any wished-for gratihcation 
unsupplied, he will have a demand for more commodities; and it will be an 
efj'ecmal demand while he has any new value to otTer in exchange for them . 
Productions are always bought by productions, or by services; money is only the 
medium by which the exchange is effected Too much of a particular commodity 
may be produced, of which there may be such a glut in the market as not to repay 
the capital expended on it, but this cannot be the case with respect to all 
commodities "' 
Ricardo is not clear as to whether he includes money in "all commodities, " an important 
distinction to be made The direct assertion by several classical economists that general 
gluts simply cannot occur gives substantial cause to take Say's Law seriously, without 
discarding it foolishly as did Keynes However, the issue was also troublesome for the 
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classicals given the enormous confusion surrounding the debate, as well as historical 
instances of general gluts. 
Ricardo, like Say, engaged in a series of debates with Malthus. Stephen Kates 
argues that one of Malthus' phrases found in a letter to Ricardo likely led Keynes defining 
Say's Law as "supply creates its own demand. " Importantly, the following reference is 
the only single text by a classical economist that remotely uses the terminology of 
Keynes. Kates writes in a footnote that 
The [Decemeber 29'"] letter is notable for a particular phrase which Malthus uses, 
'I think the source of [Say's] error is, that he does not properly distinguish 
between the necessaries of life and other commodities, — the former create rItetr 
own dentattd the latter not (Ricardo 1960-73' VI 168, italics added). It is possible 
that Keynes took the phrase 'supply creates its own demand' from this passage. 
" 
If Keynes truly took his understanding ol'what Say meant from Molthtts, perhapx5ay 's 
grearexr cottremporary cnrtc, then his entire analysis of Say's Law weakens considerably. 
It is possible that Keynes may have argued tne merits of Say's L, aw without ever pursuing 
a rigorous study of Say's own words, an error that could lead to the questioning of 
Keynes* intellectual merit 
Apart from that important discovery in the Ricardo-Malthus letters, the issue of 
Say's Law arises on several occasions Ricardo and Malthus both regard Say's 
arguments as insufficient, but Ricardo still maintains that the general principle holds. 
Ricardo and Malthus disagree about the effects of a sudden increase in production by a 
large quantity, Malthus argues that an increase leads to a surplus of goods that are 
9I Kates, var'e lan and t'tte rtevnettan It et alttttan, -tent. (Scc footnote 6) 
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wasted because of the "insufficiency of demand. " Ricardo responded with, what he 
regarded as the central issue: 
The real question is this; If money should retain the same value next year, would 
any man (if he had it) want the will to spend half as much again as he now does, — 
and if he did want the will, would he feel no inclination to add the increase of his 
revenue to his capital, and employ it as such. In short I consider the wants and 
tastes of mankind as unlimited. We all wish to add to our enjoyments or to our 
power. Consumption adds to our enjoyments, — accumulation to our power, and 
they equally promote demand. " 
Ricardo addresses the fear of Malthus (and Keynes) that "effective demand" may fail, 
leading to widespread recession and unemployment Say's Law's critics assume that 
demand will not keep up with increases in production, perhaps due to saving and 
underconsumption Ricardo rejects this notion, asserting that scarcity implies an 
unlimited fulfillment of wants. 
Ricardo was not one of the foremost advocates of Say's Law, but he embraced 
the general principles which form Say's Law. He did not comprehend its importance as 
well as James and John Stuart Mill, but he can be viewed as an opponent of the 
Malthusian analysis which Keynes hastily embraced. 
Ricardo. Das&d, 7'ae norh» ond correspondence of Dovn/Ricordo, I I rois. Vol Vl. Le//ers ////0 /8/5, 
ed. P. Sraffa sviib M. H. Dobb, (Cambndge: Cambndgc Unis crsiip Press), I 34-5 
XI. John Stuart Mill 
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) followed the lead of his father, James Mill, by 
providing solid arguments regarding Say's Law. While Murray Rothbard is quite hard on 
J. S. Mill's reliance upon the British economic tradition (as opposed to the Continental 
tradition), and argues that Mill revived poor Ricardian theory that resulted in a poor state 
of economic theory prior to John Maynard Keynes. (Keynes may have been so widely 
embraced because he seized the opportunity to replace bad economic theories with his 
own new ideas). Regardless, J. S. Mill will prove in the following excerpts that he 
understands the law of markets more lucidly than does Say, and he even understands the 
fundamental idea of Walras' Law 
J. S Mill demonstrates his implicit opposition to Keynes when he argues that 
"what a country wants to make it richer, is never consumption, but production. Where 
there is the latter, we may be sure that there is no want of the former "' One could 
hardly design a more anti-Keynes remark, given that Keynes advocated expanding 
aggregate demand to meet and stimulate aggregate production (and hence, the general 
economy) He continues with words Keynes sought to refute, saying that "there may be, 
and always are, an abundance of persons who have the inclination to become consumers 
"Mill, 1 S. , Lee's on Same lfrr serried Ouestrnrrs o Prrfrrrca/L'eonomy, Rcpnnt, lLondon: London 
School of Economics and Polnrcal Scrence, 194ak 49 
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of some commodity, but are unable to satisfy their wish, because they have not the means 
of producing either that, or anything to give in exchange for it. " ' 
Importantly, Mill realizes that production priced to sell provides the seller with 
wealth so long as there is a buyer. Hence, with or without a glut, "a single 
producer['s]. . . . affluence depends, not solely upon the quantity of his commodity which 
he has produced and laid in store, but upon his success in finding purchasers for that 
commodity. "" He then turns to the "unsettled question" of whether or not general gluts 
occur. 
There can never, it is said, be a want ofbuyers for all commodities, sellers and 
the buyers, for all commodities taken together, must, by the metaphysical 
necessity of the case, be an exact equipoise to each other . . This argument is 
evidently founded on the supposition of a state of barter; and, on that supposition, 
it is perfectly incontestable When two persons perform an act of barter, each of 
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them is at once a seller and a buyer. He cannot sell without buying 
Mill's sharp line of reasoning clearly shows the distinction between trade with and 
without money Mill argues what both advocates and critics (including Lord Keynes 
himself) of Say's Law generally agree upon that under a barter economy, Say's Law 
holds Even the some most ferocious of opponents of Say's Law (including Keynes 
himself) concede that in the "textbook, perfect-v. orld scenario, " Say's Law holds for 
tautological reasons in an aggregate barter econoiny. Budget constraints and the two- 
way nature of exchange lead to the necessary holding of Say's Law in a barter economy 
" Ibid . 49 
" Ibid. Sl 
' Ibid. 69-70 
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While Mill's analysis in a barter economy is solid, he falters when he confronts a 
money economy: 
If however, we suppose that money is used, these propositions cease to be exactly 
true. It must be admitted that no person desires tnoney for its own sake, (unless 
some very rare cases of misers be an exception, ) and that he who sells his 
commodity, receiving money in exchange, does so with the intention of 
[eventually] buying with that saine money some other commodity. . . . But there is 
this difference — that in the case of barter, the selling and the buying are 
simultaneously confounded in one operation; you sell what you have, and buy 
what you want, by one indivisible act, and you cannot do the one without doing 
the other. " 
Introducing the role of money, Mill's reasoning suggests the framework of Walras' Law 
He realizes the elaborate nature of the market process, particularly when money is 
introduced, while suggesting a realization that both barter and money economies face 
budget constraints. Hov'ever, it is significant to acknowledge that Mill is sometimes 
inconsistent in his treatment of money, because he has two definitions for money; 
commodity' money and what economist Bela Balassa calls credit money As a result, two 
"alternative interpretations" evolve from Mill according to Balassa. "commodt'tymoney 
and the impossibi li ty of a general overprodncti on on the basis of II alras' Law, on the 
one hand, and credit money and the lrossibihty of a (temporary) nnderssipply of money 
(overproduction of commodities) on the other. "'" Balassa's claims are somewhat 
exaggerated, but he points to one of the key controversies associated with Say's Law, 
namely, whether it refers to the impossibility of general gluts or not. Admitting that 
' Ibid 
" Batassa. Bcla A, "John Stuart Mill and the Lau of Markets, " (Joorterty, toornot of Fconos~roee 73(2), 
(May I ssa). 268 Italics are Balassa's 
57 
"credit money" allows for intertemporal problems absent in a barter economy or even 
commodity-based money economy, Mill writes that 
It may well occur, that there may be, at some given time, a very general 
inclination to sell with as little delay as possible, accompanied with a general 
inclination to defer all purchases as long as possible. This is always actually the 
case in those periods which are described as periods of general excess. And no 
one, after sufhcient explanation, will contest the possibility of general excess, in 
this sense of the word. 
Hence, Mill concedes that disturbances in the money market may temporarily bring about 
disequilibria in the form of aggregate oversupply of non-money goods Yet the cause of 
such an event is evidently money-induced discoordination rather than aggregate 
underconsumption 
Directly combating Malthus' faulty notion of permanent reduced consumption, 
Mill meticulously explains the reason for 'general excess" as described by Malthus 
Although he who sells, really sells only to buy, he need not buy at the same 
moment when he sells, and he does not therefore necessarily add to the immed ure 
demand for one commodity when he adds to the supply of another. The buying 
and selling being now separated, it may very well occur, that there may be, at 
some given time, a very general inclination to sell with as little delay as possible, 
accompanied with an equally general inclination to defer all purchases as long as 
possible. "" 
Mill acknowledges that demand to hold money (in real purchasing power) may increase 
He, like Say, sees this as a potential intertemporal coordination problem, but not an 
inherently negative activity The scene that Mill describes applies to incidents of a 
shortage of money because prices are too high. When involving money, Mill 
' Mdk Lssays on Unrented Oaesnons: 70. 
""' 1tnd. 70 
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foreshadows Walras, who addresses the impossibility of aggregate excess demand across 
all markets, in general. Mill writes: 
In order to render the argument for the impossibility of an excess of all 
commodities applicable to the case in which a circulating medium is employed, 
money itself must be considered a commodity. It must, undoubtedly, be admitted 
that there cannot be an excess of all other commodities, and an excess of money 
at the same time. "' 
Mill is correct because otherwise an "adding up" problem would occur This is 
practically a statement of Walras' Law itself. He reasons that what some regard as a 
'general superabundance" is simply a positive excess demand for the commodity money 
and a negative excess demand for other commodities That is, a general glut of non- 
money goods implies a shortage of money This, of course, can be seen empirically in the 
scramble for "liquidity*' during times of recessions 
Mill turns his discussion over to the transient nature of gluts. Here he supports 
Say's acknowledgement that gluts might occur temporarrIy. "It is true, " says Mill, "that 
this state can only be temporary, and must even be succeeded by a reaction of 
corresponding violence, since those tvho have sold without buying will certainly buy at 
last, and there will then be more buyers than sellers. '* Mill suggests Pigou's real balance 
effect here, an important discovery since the classical economists have been criticized for 
their lack of a monetary theory 
Importantly, Mill makes it clear that gluts are phenomena only in the short-run, 
thereby furthering his argument Mill may accept the existence of a general glut in non- 
money goods, but he distinguishes his concession as applying to the short-run alone 
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"Although the general over-supply is of necessity only temporary, " he continues, "this is 
no more than may be said of every partial over-supply. An overstocked state of the 
market is always temporary, and is generally followed by a more than common briskness 
of demand. "" 
Mill extends his argument with the inclusion of money as a commodity by 
addressing the crucial role of prices. He states that should a "general' glut occur, then 
the prices of all goods will fall, or the goods themselves will not be sold "When this 
happens to one single commodity, " he says in reference to a non-money commodity, 
'there is said to be a superabundance of that commodity; and if that be a proper 
expression, there would seem to be in the nature of the case no particular impropriety in 
saying that there is a superabundance of all or most commodities, when all or most of 
them are in this same predicament. *'"' 
Mill points out that an excess of OII non-money commodities simply indicates a 
"temporary fall in their value relative to money. . [T]here cannot be excessive production 
of commodities in general " He concludes by remarking that what appears to be excess »104 
in general supply may simply be "want of commercial confidence" or some other 
alteration in the behavior of individuals due to altered expectations. Mill, like Keynes, 
relies on a vague phenomenon of individuals experiencing unexplained "mood swings" in 
their market behavior. Keynes focused on the "animal spirits" of businessinen who may 
Ibid 71. 
Ibid 71 
Ibid. , 72 
"" Ibid, 72-3 
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alter their behavior due to sudden emotional responses. In reality, what Keynes describes 
is really a credit "boom" or "bust. " 
Published in 1848, Principles of Poli ti cal Economy extends J. S. Mifls' arguments 
favoring Say's Law. Mill follows his father's line of reasoning, with an emphasis on 
purchasing power. The following passage is particularly important because Keynes 
would later quote the first part, though not the last part, of the passage. I have italicized 
the part of the passage which Keynes later quoted Observe that Mill's argument is not 
complete until the conclusion of the passage, an important omission of Keynes. 
IIrhat consli lnles lhe meatis of payment for commodi li es is simply commridr ties. 
Each person 's meaiis of paying for lhe production of other people consist of 
those which he himself poisesses. Could we suddenly douhle the productive 
powers vf the connlry, we should double the supply rrf commoditiesin every 
market; bnt we should, by the same stroke, double the purchasmg power. 
Everybody ivould bring a double demand as well as supply. every body would be 
able lo bny twice as nnrch, hecrmse every one would have twice as much to offhr 
in exihaiige. It is probable, indeed, that there would now be a superfluity of 
certain things Although the community would willingly double its aggregate 
consumption, it may already have as much as it desires of some commodities, and 
it may prefer to do more than double its consumption of others, or to exercise its 
increased purchasing power on some new thing. If so, the supply will adapt itself 
accordingly, and the values of things will continue to conform to their cost of 
production. At any rate, it is a sheer absurdity that all things should fall in value, 
and that all producers should, in consequence, be insufliciently renumerated. 
'" 
Mill argues that costs of production derive from prices (which are affected by consumer' s 
willingness to pay and scarcity). The passage above may be one of his best, for he lucidly 
rebuts the critics' problem with Say's Law. Mill answers opponents of Says' Law who 
simply observe that general gluts can and do exist. 
'" Mill, John Stuart, Pnncrpler of Polrrrool Eronornv. 5SR 
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To sum, J. S. Mill provides some of the most eloquent arguments in favor of Says' 
Law, exceeding even his father's contribution to the defense of Say's Law. He provides 
sound reasoning as well as clarity on money, which is central to any substantial analysis of 
Say's Law. Gary Becker writes that aAer reading J. S. Mill's Unsettled Questions and 
Principles, 'one is led to wonder why so much of the subsequent literature (this paper 
included) had to be written at all. "'" 
"Becker Gary S and Vvilham l. Bauino!. "The Classical Monelary Theory. The Outcome ol' the 
Discussion — hcononnrn, 7ti. (Nov t952k S76. Becker was rcfcrring to the clarification of the meanmg 
of Sat s Law itself, which has been largely misunderstood and frequentb disputed 
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XIL Karl Marx 
Karl Marx (1818-1883) has had an enormous influence on political and economic 
philosophy since his death, and while his theories are largely regarded as irrelevant in 
modern economic theory, his scathing criticism of Say deserves analysis. Other than 
Keynes, Marx is the most famous critic of Say's Law, and his criticism is far more 
scathing than even that of Keynes. Marx devoted a chapter entitled "Crises' to Say in his 
posthumously-published collection of essays, lheories on Surplus Value. Marx regarded 
Say with contempt, at times reducing himself to name-calling; he calls Say "that miserable 
fellow", the "humbug himself", and "inane, " and regards a quote by Say as "childish 
babble *' 
However, one should separate Marx' od homutem attacks from the content of his 
theory Whatever his remarks might suggest about his personality, one should not 
discredit Marx merely based upon his unusual writing style Focusing on the substance of 
Marx, Bernice Shoul addresses what scent to be inherent self-contradictory theories based 
on a rejection or reliance of Say's Law. He argues that three primary Marxian dubious 
models deal directly with Say's Law '(1) the circular flow model which postulates Say's 
Law, (2) the model of monetary exchange which denies Say's Law; and (3) the dynamic 
model which provisionally assumes Say's Law only as a means for demonstrating a 
tendency to break-down and the inevitability of crises and cycles in spire of the operation 
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of Say*s Law. ""' Thomas Sowell concisely highlights six major areas of Say's Law 
which Marx argues against, the most significant of which being: first, that aggregate 
supply and aggregate demand are not equal, ex ante, because no one can predict prices; 
second, that even if aggregate supply and aggregate demand are equal, ex ante, it is an 
irrelevant equivalence; and third, that the arguments that gluts are caused by undersupply 
in a different market are false since a glut is caused by "over-production" in one market 
rather than 'under-production" in another. "" 
The "General Glut Controversy" had subsided during Marx' lifetime, and the most 
significant arguments for Say's Law — asserted by Say himself and James and John Stuart 
Mill — were already written and familiar to anyone in the general glut controversy "The 
basic dichotomy was between those economists who attributed crises or depressions to 
internally disproportionate output and those who attributed them to excess aggregate 
output Marx saw dispropottionality as the initiating force of crises " Marx did not 
follow the "underconsumptionist'* theoiy set forth by Malthus and others, criticizing that 
position against Say by remarking that "it is pure tautology to say that crises are caused 
by the scarcity of solvent consumers, or of a paying consumption """ 
I. ess distinct from Keynes than Keynesians might readily admit, Marx argues that 
it is in saving (and the consequent expansion of capital) that the opportunity for a crisis, 
or general glut, arises. He admits that saving increases production and expands 
Shord, Bernice, "Karl Marx and Say's Laiv. *' ()oorierly Jortnial of Econooncs, 71(4). (Ncv. 1957), 
612 
"' Scircll, Thonias, Sov'sIrra":ln Iftsroncol. dna(yn», (Pnnceton. Pnnceton Urtivcrsit) Press. 
1972). 181-182. 
" 
. Ibid, 169. 
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population, but a tendency toward excessive saving due to the "boundless urge of the 
capitalists to enrich themselves""' causes economic crisis. While Keynes focuses on the 
failure of investment and aggregate spending (rather than adopting Marx' focus on saving 
per se), both pay great attention to saving-investment disequilibrium. 
Marx argues that the assertion by Say and (James) Mill that a general glut cannot 
occur relies upon the assumption that commodities are exchanged with commodities. 
importantly, the argument set forth by Say and James Mill is distinct; Mill argues that 
general gluts cannot occur (while Say never fully adopts this view) With the role of 
capital (implicitly, saving) and money. however, Marx projects the occurrence of 
stagnation. Capital is invested over long periods, and, as Marx asserts, 
In the course of tliese periods great upheavals and changes in markets take place, 
since great changes in the productivity of labour and therefore in the real tttlve of 
commodities take place — it is (beret'ore very evident that from the starting point- 
the advance of capital — until its return at the end of one of these periods, great 
catastrophes must occur and elements of crises must accumulate and develop- 
and these cannot in any way be got rid of by the pitiful claptrap that products 
exchange against products ' t is 
Marx argues that gluts are inevitable consequences in a market with money and saving, 
and circumvents the importance of distinguishing between flexible and fixed pricing 
conditions No classical economist argued that Say's Law would hold under fixed prices, 
for Say's Law depends inherently upon the ability of markets to adjust (in particular, 
market prices). Marx then proceeds to criticize the apparent discrepancy in Say-Mill 
"" Marx, Karl, Cntutak Vol. II. (Chicago: Charles LL Kerr k Co, 1909), 86 
"' Marx. KarL Theoneson 9hrptus I blue, Translated by t LA Bonner and Emile Burns. (htew York. 
Augustus M Kcllcy, 1971) 368 
ibid, 371 
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thought which he claims denies the existence of general gluts of commodities while 
acknowledging the possibility and tendency toward the over-abundance of capital. "Not 
a single responsible economist of the post-Ricardo period, " he writes, "denies the 
[possibility of] overabundance of capital. On the contrary, they all explain crises by 
it. . . Therefore they all admit overproduction in one form, but deny it in another. 
"'" He 
argues that the role of money leads to the potential for crises, for a "crisis is nothing but 
the forcible assertion of the unity of phases of the production process which have become 
independent of each other. *' " Clearly Marx implies that the role of money allo~s for this 
separation to occur, thereby nullifying Say's Law in a money economy (this argument 
that the existence of a money market nullifies Say's Law is present in Keynesian thought 
as well) 
Admittedly, the role of money, particularly non-commodity money, requires 
clarification byWalras' Law or the real balance effect Writes Marx, 
No crisis can exist unless sale and purchase become separated form each other 
and come into conllict, or the contradictions inherent in money as means of 
payment come to the surface; unless therefore crisis at the same time emerges in 
the simple form as the contradiction inherent in money as means of payment ui 
Marx addresses the concession by Say-Mill supporters that a partial glut can occur (while 
still maintaining the theoretical improbability of general gluts). It is during this discussion 
which Marx makes a surprising assertion: "That only particttlar but not till kinds of 
commodities can constitute a glut in the market, and that consequently overproduction 
' Ibid. , 374 
' ' Ibid 3II3 
'" Ibid. 3X6 
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can always only be partial, is a paltry evasion. . . In fact, all commodities [may be in 
oversupply] except money. "'" Surprisingly, Marx concludes that aH markets may be 
glutted at once except money, an observation which most Say-Mill supporters would 
embrace, particularly Walras. In addition, Marx argues that "for a crisis (and therefore 
also overproduction) to be general, it is sufficient for it to grip the principal articles of 
trade. "'" 
Given Marx' visceral objection to Say — both the man and his doctrine — one finds 
such concessions unexpected from such an opponent of Say's Law Say and Walras (et 
al) consider a general glut in terms of all markets, and while Marx redefines, in a sense, 
the conditions for a general market, he concedes on the arguments, such as accepting 
Walras' Law, that ironically most justify Say's Law 
Walras' Law is perhaps the greatest boost to Say's Law because it is readily 
accepted by mainstream economists. Say, Mill, and Walras accept that a partial glut can 
and may occur; recall that Walras' Law suggests that as much as n-1 markets (in an 
economy with n markets) may experience a glut, the nth market offsets the glut, because 
excess demand must sum to zero within an exchange economy. While Marx does not 
appea~ to find his virtual acceptance of Walras' Law as a concession, it is difficult to 
defend the logic behind Walras' Law ~bile trashing the very notion of Say's Law 
Marx continues his condemnation of the Say-Mill approach, having compiled a 
chapter on crises with a combination of muddled, poor, or downright false assertions and 
' " tbid. , 3S2 
"' tbid, 393. 
a few (unintended) statements which lend his opponents some support. While Marx' 
arguments fail to discredit Say's Law, some of the foundations for his arguments are not 
that distinct from those of the most successful critic ot Say's Law, John Maynard Keynes. 
Xm. A. C. Pigou 
Arthur Cecil Pigou (1877-1959) found himself the target of Keynes' criticism in 
the General Theory. Pigou was to Keynes the quintessential contemporary economist to 
embrace all of the alleged ills of the classical economists. Regarded as the product of 
Alfred Marshall, Pigou and Keynes were highly critical of each other, though Pigou 
eventually adopted many Keynesian viewpoints. Pigou occupied a prestigious chair and 
was a prolific economist, so Pigou was an important economist in his own right, and 
deserves distinction for his, say, real balance effect, beyond being the frequent target of 
Keynes 
Pigou wrote a series of texts on economics with a particular interest in money, 
unemployment, and welfare economics. In one small text entitled Lapses from Full 
Fittfilvyntent (1945), Pigou wrote that the classical economists 
Never had any doubt that, provided only thorough-going competition exists 
among wage-earners, there must be a tendency towards full employment, and, 
apart from changes and frictions, there must actually be full employment. This 
implies that in stable conditions, apart from friction, imperfect mobility and so on, 
the establishment of a sufficiently low rate of money wages would carry with it 
full employment in a/I circumstances. lie 
This point is crucial, because the classical economists approached Say's Law with the 
embedded assumption that price llexibility and competitive conditions pervaded the 
market In stark contrast, Keynes' models were created upon the implicit assumption that 
prices and wages were inflexible, and that market conditions would not lead to prevailing 
Pigoo, A. C. , Lapses from Full Eruploumeni. (London Macmillan lit Co, 1945), 20. 
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full employment output. In essence, Keynes throws away the doctrine by eliminating its 
necessary assumptions and then "proving" it as fallacious. Pigou recognizes that the 
classical economists did not address the conditions that prevent Say's Law — and the 
market mechanism — from occurring. Specifically, their focus was not on the hindrances 
to proper coordination but rather on the outcome when no such hindrances occurred. 
Pigou then argues that the classical economists' understanding needs to be 
"qualified. " Specifically, he addresses the fact that (a) stable conditions must exist in this 
analysis, and (2) terminology must be properly defined (for instance, savings and 
investment). He then turns to Keynes opposing view of market behavior in instances of 
unemployment. He describes Keynes' view as follows 
When, through a failure of profitable openings for investment, the rate of interest 
has been forced down to the minimum, it is probable that people will want to 
supply some savings (investment) for reasons of prestige, security, and so on, 
even though none are demanded . . Thus there must come about a continuous 
withdrawal of more and more money from circulation and a resultant continuous 
fall in the size ofaggregate money income Ifmoney wage rates do not fall this 
leads directly to reduced unemployment; if they do fall, since the cuts in wages set 
up equivalent further cuts in money income, it still leads to this, the only 
difference being that money income comes down faster. This downward process 
does not, however, go on forever, because, as employment falls, people, being 
poorer, do not desire to make such large savings. Thus ultimately there is no 
longer an excess in the amount of what they want to save or invest above the 
amount that industrialists require At this point the downward process stops and 
there is established a new low-level equilibrium, with employment much less than 
full. '" 
The last statement suggests a misunderstanding of the proper role of equilibrium, since 
mass unemployment implies disequilibrium by nature. Pigou, though no fully satisfied 
with the classical account, finds Keynes' view inadequate. He argues that Keynes' 
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analysis is faulty in concluding that a lower-level of employment results in equilibrium. 
He offers an alternative view. 
Suppose that, when the original equilibrium is disturbed by opportunities for 
profitable investment being contracted in the way we have described and, in 
consequence, money income goes crashing downwards, money wage rates crash 
downwards parallel with it. It is true that, since the rate of interest does not fall, 
the cuts in money wage rates entail equivalent proportionate cuts in money 
income and the money demand for labour. But the several actions and reactions 
are presumably separated by time-lags. Hence, it would seem, though, owing to 
the inevitable lag in the first wage reduction, employment must be cut down, it 
will not be cut down progressively The pursuer will be behind the pursued 
because he has got a worse start, but will not afterwards fall further behind him 
Hence Lord Keynes*s low-level equilibrium will not be attained. . since, afler 
employment and the scale of real income have ceased falling, money income 
continues to fall, prices must also continue to fall. '" 
Pigou is not entirely correct here, for his reasoning is confusing and he emphasizes too 
much on the aggregate without analyzing the effects on markets, real income, 
employment, and price levels Pigou realizes that ivith flexible falling prices, the market 
process can guarantee a resumption of equilibrium at a level at least closer to the initial 
full-employment equilibrium He concedes that the perception of what occurs is 
controversial, and even suggests that due to its controversy, the issue itself is not 
significant However, he makes an important point which Keynesians and careless 
economists make under stable conditions without hindrances to the adjustment 
mechanism, the classical analysis is correct Furthermore, if government intervenes to fix 
wage rates (or create price rigidity), then the ability for the market process has been 
impeded Intervention violates the prior market conditions and, accordingly, leads to 
"'Ibid. 23 
' Ibid, 23-2-1. 
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different outcomes from those predicted by classical economists. Pigou, acknowledging 
this point, observes that should government intervene, "thorough-going competition 
among wage-earners would have been interdicted; and it is no part of the classical view 
that, if that were done, there would be a tendency for full employment to establish 
itself. ""' 
Pigou's "real-balance effect" would prove to upset a fundamental argument of 
Keynes. Arguing that markets cannot self-correct in a state of unemployment (or 
recession), Keynes asserts that dov nward price and wage flexibility do not exist because 
"of the agglomeration of monopoly power on both the input and output sides of the 
market. "' Additionally, Keynes argues that falling prices beget falling wages by 
equiproportional amount, and consequently, income and employment do not increase. 
Hence, real wages would not decline. Pigou counters this analysis with the recognition 
that when prices decline, the real balance (M&P=real value of money, where M=money, 
P=price level) or purchasing power of the money stock increases That is, as the price 
level declines, the real exchange value of each unit of money rises. 1n ef'ect, a general 
"wealth effect*' (or portfolio imbalance creating too much money) stimulates consumption 
spending The important recognition of this fact by Pigou nullifies Keynes' liquidity trap 
and faulty analysis of falling prices. To Ekelend and Hebert, 'the Pigou effect saves 
neoclassical theory" from Keynes' condemnation. "' This may be a gross exaggeration, 
' Ibid, 25. 
Ekclund. Robert aod Robert Hebert, &I H& riort r&f hc»ar&a &c Theory a»rl, &&ferhod, 4" cd (New York 
McGraw-H&II Co 1997). 480. 
Ibid 4III 
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but it nonetheless reveals a belief by some that the Pigou effect is central theory to 
modern macroeconomics. 
With regard to a more specific view on Say's Law, Pigou argues that "the 
problem in recession is that there is not enough aggregate demand, and the practical 
remedies are related to whether the level of demand can be increased. "' Demand is 
considered to be deficient due to supply side discoordination. While Pigou asserts that 
the government can increase demand artificially, he does not abandon Say's Law in the 
haphazard manner of Keynes. However, he compromises the truth in erroneously 
attributing the cause of recessions to demand deficiency Like Marx, who conceded the 
points that strengthen the defense for Say's Lav. , Pigou accepts the Malthus-Keynes 
'underconsumptionist" cause of recessions In doing so, he undercuts much of the logic 
of his argument, for wrongly identifying an event's cause likely leads to an incorrect 
solution. 
While Pigou misunderstands the origin of recessions, he still adopts the theoretical 
framework of the law of markets. For instance, in describing the effects of 
unemployment occurring in one or several markets, he writes that the producers of these 
markets will reduce purchases from various other markets during this time of economic 
trouble As a result, demand for some (or all) goods in various markets declines. While 
Pigou does not overtly state that this decline in demand results from a decline in 
production, the logical steps which he takes clearly imply that one leads to the other (i e, 
' 
Kaics, Stephen M . . 5'oy '. s Raw and the Revneston Revolut ton. liow arocroeconontto Theorv I ost us 
tftlv, (Chelienham. Edward Elgar Publishing. 1998). 99 
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a drop in production leads to a drop in demand). He also argues that the causes for 
recessions in various periods arise from difficulties independent of money. That is, the 
causes occur with or without the existence of money in the world. However, he argues, 
in reality adjustments (like recessions or gluts) "are intensified by reflex price 
influences "'" This is due to the varying turnover rates of money balances affected by 
varying economic conditions; when time are "good, " people borrow more and turn over 
balances frequently, while in "bad" times, saving increases and pessimism over the future 
of the economy increases. 
Pigou may not thoroughly embrace Say's Law but his real-balances effect has 
implications which severely hurt Keynes' argument against the ability for markets to 
adjust to crises. Furthermore, the Pigou effect supports the conclusions introduced by 
Walras' Law that point out the role of money as a major factor in analyzing the causes 
and definitions of crises. If nothing more, Pigou clarifies the main disequilibrium 
implications of Walras' Law 
' Pigou. A. C. , Rsvvvc m, 1ppherJ i"ovnvrrrrca (Lo!idoir P S, King r9. Soo, Lid, 1923), 37 
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XIV. Leon Walras 
One of the objectives of this paper is to affirm or deny that Walras' Law'" is the 
formalization of Say's, and that the implications of Walras' Law (in addition to Say's 
Law) are crucial to a solid understanding of macroeconomic theory Whether Walras 
fully accepted Say's own writing or not is somewhat irrelevant, for the relation between 
the two theories may be found present despite any intentional devotion to Say's Law by 
Walras We acknowledge that Walras himself never attributes his development of 
Walras' Law to Say, though he must have been familiar with his fellow Frenchman's 
work 
The French economist Leon Walras (1834-1910) remains an important figure in 
economics as a leader of the marginalist utility revolution. He is also perhaps the most 
influential economist in "mathematizing" the held of economics Walras was never 
formally trained in economics, though his father was an economist and taught Walras in a 
manner akin to the relationship between John Stuart and James Mill, albeit a less rigorous 
training Despite Walras' lack of formal economic training, Joseph Schumpeter regarded 
him as "the greatest of all economists" His study and understanding of mathematics is 
present throughout his writing on economics. He is most noted for his general 
equilibrium theory and Walras' I aw. Walras' Law says that if N-1 markets experience 
positive excess demand&0 (glut), then the Nth market has negative excess demand 
Broadly defined. Walrus' Lais says that d N-1 markets experience excess demand&0. then Ihe Nth 
market must offset the excess demand so tluit the aggregate suui of excess demand equals zero 
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(shortage) of equal money value because the aggregate sum of excess demand always 
equals zero. In other words, the total value of all goods demanded (including money) 
must equal the total value of goods supplied (including money). Thomas Sowell remarks 
that it also "implies that an excess quantity of [all] goods supplied is the same as an 
excess demand for money. "' ' Sowell's interpretation is somewhat unclear, but it appears 
that he means that Walras' Law implies that a general positive excess supply of all non- 
money goods is equal to a general negative excess supply of money. That is, Sowell 
rearranges the formula of Walras' Law from 
n n 
(2) g p, D, = g p, S, whereby 
n 1 
(3) P p, D =- Pp, D, + Dn and 
(4) P I&, S, — = P I&, S, + Sn where Dn and 5„represent the nth (money) markets. 
Therefore, Sowell is simply observing the conditions which hold given mathematical 
rearrangements of Equation (l) 
Walras has been frequently compared and contrasted with Alfred Marshall, and it 
has been said that "perhaps one of the most instructive contrasts between Walras and 
Marshall concerns the so-caged law of markets "' ' While Marshall emphasizes the role 
' ' Sowcll. Thomas Say 3 tan . 4n 17&sror&r&r&inlnoi&s&a (Pnncclon Princeton Unbersrty Press, l972). 
34. 
' ' Ekelnnd Robert B . and Robert F. llebert. A Hisrory o j Erono»nc 7 her&ry &n&d Are&bod 388 
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of quantity differences in markets, particularly as the "adjusting variable" to maintain 
equilibrium, Walras highlights prices as the key adjusting mechanism to overcoming 
disequilibrium. 
Walras builds up to his law in Elements of Pure Economics, published originally 
in 1874 in French, and the first major work laying the groundwork for mathematical 
economics. Walras first addresses a two-market, barter exchange economy. It is clear 
that Walras entirely accepts Say's Law under a barter economy Developing his 
argument further, he then introduces money (artificiafiy, as opposed to Say's and Carl 
Menger's treatment), and as before, implicitly accepts Say's Law when commodity 
money is introduced. Implicitly, if money is a commodity, then Walras' Law indicates 
that given instantaneous equilibrium price adjustments, an increase or decrease in money 
demand does not lead to a general glut. However, Walras' Law extends his acceptance 
from the simple barter economy to a world where fiat money, saving, and complexity 
exists 
Related peripherally in terms of an understanding of a general equilibrium theory, 
Walras mathematically concludes that the equilibrium of m-I markets mathematically 
implies an equilibrium in the mth market. Walras states his framework based upon 
general equilibrium analysis after some careful mathematical derivations. 
Thus m-1 prices of m-I of the m commodities are determined mathematically in 
terms of the mth commodity which serves as the numerarre, when the following 
three conditions are satisfied. first that each and every party to the exchange 
obtain the maximum satisfaction of his wants, the raiios of his &nreresthen being 
equal to the prices; second that each and every party give up quantities that stand 
in a definite ratio to the quantities received and vice versa, there being only one 
price in terms of the ntorieraire for each commodity, namely the price at which 
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total effective demand equals total effective offer; and third that there be no 
occasion for arbitrage transactions, the equilibrium price of one of any two 
commodities in terms of any third commodity. ' 
It is clear that Walras believes that "the upward and downward movements of prices 
solve the system of equations of offer and demand. "'" His emphasis on the important 
function of prices in maintaining equilibrium reveals a weakness in Say's own analysis, 
which often lacked a focus upon prices as the crucial key to markets adjusting in times of 
crises. 
Concluding his analysis, Walras summarizes Walras' Law as follows (Walras' 
italics) 
We are now in a position to formulate the law of the establishment of equilibrium 
prices in the case of the exchange of several commodities for one another through 
the medium of a numeraire: Given. several comniodities, whrch are exchanged for 
one anolher through the medium of a numeraire, for lhe mariret lo be in a slate of 
equi lrhrium i&r for the price of each and every commodrty m terms of lhe 
numeraire to he stationary, il rs necessary and sufficieru lhal at these prices lhe 
effective demand for each commodity equal its effective offer. Ifhen this equahly 
is ahsent, the atlanmient of equi ii hnum prices requrres a rise m prvces of' those 
comnvMities the eff'ective demand for which is greater than the effective offer, 
rmd a fall m lhe prvces of those commodities the effective offer of'which is 
greater than the effective demand. ' " 
Beyond his contributions through Walras' Law, Walras adopts some ideas 
relevant to the discussion For instance, he separates investment and saving, thereby 
suggesting a potential problem arising from inequalities between the two "Keynes did 
not accept Say's Law, emphasizing the fact that investment and saving are independently 
' Walras. Leon. [1926l Eten&ertrsofPure Ecz&r&r&mrccc Translated by William Jatre, (New York: 
Augustus M. Kctlcy Pubbsbcrs, 1969). 169 
" Ibid. , 170. 
Ibid. 172. 
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decided by different groups of individuals, while Walras, although he also emphasized this 
same fact, paradoxically assumed a smooth adjustment of aggregate investment to 
aggregate saving, " writes Michio Morishima, an opponent of Say's Law. " While 
Keynes himself wrote that aggregate investment and aggregate saving must necessarily be 
equal, he apparently did not regard this equality as assured. 
Walras never formally attributes his "law" to Say, nor does he suggest that 
Walras' law is a sophisticated understanding or explicit formalization of the law of 
markets In fact, Walras mentions Say in his Elements oj Pure Economics only to 
compare Smith and Say's respective theories of value. However, the relation between 
Say's Law and Walras' Law, whether explicitly intentional or not, remains firm W H 
Hutt writes "Walras' famous work can be reasonably interpreted as a detailed, 
mathematical statement of the law of markets, although Walras himself seems not to have 
perceived it. ""' 
Mircslnma, Micliio, 8'alras' brmrouucea, 4 Pure Theorv of Cnptia) and Alone)t (Cambndge: 
Cambndgc University Press, 1977). 60. 
' ' Hutt. W H, . 4 i(ehahthiartou of Say 'r I aw, (Athens Ohio Unncrsib Press, l974), 46 
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XV. John Maynard Keynes 
Undoubtedly Say's greatest critic of the 21" Century, John Maynard Keyes (1883- 
1946) is perhaps his most successful opponent, for Keynes literally carved out the field of 
macroeconomics. Much of his analysis was accepted for decades despite negative 
reviews at the time of its publication, and many — though not all — mainstream 
economists, who for various reasons embraced his "New Economics" without serious 
inquiry into its merits and faults Even opponents of Keynes, such as Milton Friedman 
and the Chicago School, engaged in a battle with Keynes in his own terms, leading to 
their (perhaps unintended) acceptance of the Keynesian framework and methodology 
while simultaneously maintaining that his analysis fell short. Thus the debate became 
about the details of Keynesian thought, rather than its validity as a general framework for 
economic analysis 
What largely distinguished Keynes from his predecessors and contemporaries was 
his new approach to economics, with an emphasis on short-run conditions and theories 
based upon new assumptions that would later be formalized into a set of IS-LM models 
There appear to be substantial evidence that most economists shortly prior to Keynes 
were very confused on money and the macroeconomy As economist Leland Yeager 
plainly stated to me, "economic theory was in a sorry state of affairs just prior to 
Keynes. " This provided an opportunitv for an ambitious economist to reject the "archaic" 
classical notions and provide a new set of tools and analysis. Consequently, some have 
suggested that perhaps the classicals' passive defense of Say's Law fueled Keynes' revolt 
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away from Say's Law and other classical discoveries. Hutt argues that "the relevant 
content of [classical] economics which Keynes attacked was not its monetary theory but 
its tacit acceptance of Say's law. ""' 
It has been argued that Keynes' greatest accomplishment was his attack on Say's 
Law Indeed, over half a century ago Paul M. Sweezey predicted that today's economists 
would regard Keynes as victorious over the "classical fallacy. " "Historians fifty years 
from now may record that Keynes' greatest achievement was the liberation of Anglo- 
American economics from a tyrannical dogma [namely, Say's Law], and the may even 
conckide that this was essentially a work of negation unmatched by comparable positive 
achievements " Fifiy years afier Sweezey wrote this, the question over whether »tss 
economists outright (or implicitly) reject (or accept) Say's Law remains important 
Keynes vigorously attacked Say's Law, claiming that its fundamental premise in 
classical economics was a primary cause for erroneous classical economic theory 
Keynes, like Malthus before him, believed that defenders of Say's Law believed without 
exception that general gluts could never occur Henry Hazlitt counters this belief, writing 
that "No important economist, to my knowledge, ever made the absurd assumption (of 
which Keynes by implication accuses the whole classical school) that thanks to Say's Law 
depressions and unemployment were impossible, and that everything produced would 
automatically find a ready market at a profitable price. "" 
' ' Ibid. , 143 Hutt used uuuecessar) italics. uhich I have remoted licrc. 
' Swcczcy. Paul M in lhe %'ea h conmmcs, ed Sevmour E Barns, (Neiv York: Alfred Knopf. 1947), 
105. 
' Hazlitt, Henry, The h'en!are arise 'Vem Econr&nues', (Princeton D Vau Nostrand Company, 1959), 
reprint, (les tngtou-ott-Hudson The Foundation for Economic Education, Inc . 1994). 35. 
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In large part, the argument between Say and Keynes centers on what Keynes 
regards as the basic belief by classical economists that the free market tends toward full 
employment. By regarding full employment — except during times of recessions — as the 
normal state of economic affairs, many of the classical economists relied on Say's Law as 
being valid. In reality, says Keynes, the actual existence of chronic unemployment in 
markets refutes Say's Law as a general principle. In reality, unemployment simply means 
that a labor glut exists (which usually coincides vdth other gluts in goods and services). 
Keynes does not hide his scorn of Say's Law because he devoted four pages of his 
4enem1 Theory to debunking Say's Law In his most famous passage on the principle, 
he remarks that 
I doubt if many modern economists really accept Say's Law that supply creates its 
own demand. But they have not been aware that they were tacitly assuming it 
Thus the psychological law underlying the multiplier has escaped notice. It has 
not been observed that the amount of consumption goods which it pays 
entrepreneurs to produce is a function of the amount of investment goods which it 
pays them to produce. The explanation is to be found, I suppose, in the tacit 
assumption that every individual spends the whole of his income either on 
consumption or on buying, directly and indirectly, newly produced capital goods. 
But, here again, whilst the older economists expressly believed this, I doubt if 
many contemporary economists really do believe it. They have discarded these 
older ideas without becoming aware of the consequences. ' u7 
This passage is little more than an artful parody of Say, for it wrongly characterizes Say's 
Law, and then proceeds to argue in terms of poorly defined aggregates. He relies upon a 
function based on autonomous investment as a function of consumption He has been 
criticized for separating saving and investment so much that he loses sight of their 
interconnectedness Fearing inequalities between the two, he ignores the role of time in 
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the individual's decision-making process, whereby one may choose to move consumption 
into the future for a multitude of reasons. As suggested by the fact that individuals must 
have a rational motive to save (and invest), the relationship between investment and 
interest rates is considered to be inversely related. 
Importantly, Keynes quotes John Stuart Mill's Principles of Politica/ Economy, 
and this reference has become the cause of much criticism over Keynes' attack on Say's 
Law. "" Numerous scholars have acknowledged that Keynes cuts J S. Mill's passage 
short, and in doing so, eliminates the most important part of Mill's argument. Some have 
contended that Keynes simply borrowed MiH's quote from a second-hand source, and did 
not realize that he had missed the meaning of the passage by unknowingly eliminating the 
crux of the argument Furthermore, the passage was taken out of context, and does not 
fully encompass the classical understanding of Say's Law As Keynes' quotes, John 
Stuart Mill argues that 
What constitutes the means of payment for commodities is simply commodities. 
Each person's means of paying for the production of other people consist of those 
which he himself possesses. All sellers are inevitably, and by the meaning of the 
word, buyers. Could we suddenly double the productive powers of the country, 
we should double the supply of commodities in every market, but we should, by 
the same stroke, double the purchasing power. Everybody would bring a double 
demand as well as supply; everybody would be able to buy twice as much, 
because every one would have twice as much to offer in exchange 
"' Ke&nes, Jolui Maynard. The Cohecrert lliurtngs r&f John. thtynnrdfs'annex Vol XJV. 
' ' I mcnuon Kevnes' omission in a puor section on John Stuart Mill, but haie added thc quotation again 
due to its signilicancc in Ihc understandmg of Keynes' attack on Say's Law 
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The following remarks by J. S. Mill provide the context for his statements and fulfill the 
meaning of what Keynes quoted. These observations immediately following the 
quotation above in Mill's original text: 
It is probable, indeed, that there would now be a superfluity of certain things. 
Although the community would willingly double its aggregate consumption, it 
may already have as much as it desires of some commodities, and it may prefer to 
do more than double its consumption of others, or to exercise its increased 
purchasing power on some new thing. If so, the supply will adapt itself 
accordingly, and the values of things will continue to conform to their cost of 
production. "' 
Keynes attacks Say directly in his magnum opus, The Cleneral JJterrry of 
Employment, Interest, and Mone», by stating that his theory is an express rebuttal of 
Say's "classical doctrine. " After establishing two functions, Z=-cd(N) and D — f(N) (where 
Z is defined as the aggregate supply function of final goods and services, and D is defined 
as the aggregate demand function, with N representing the size of employment in terms of 
workers), he argues what Say's Law means in terms of his functions Keynes provides no 
mechanism tying these two arbitrary non-monetized aggregate functions together 
The classical doctrine, on the other hand, which used to be expressed 
categorically in the statement that 'Supply creates its own Demand' and continues 
to underlie all orthodox economic theory, involves a special assumption as to the 
relationship between these two functions. For 'Supply creates its own Demand' 
must mean that tp(N) and Z(N) are equal for ctlf values N, i e for all levels of 
output and employment, and that when there is an increase in (Z= tp(N)) 
corresponding to an increase in N, (D — f(N)) necessarily increases by the same 
amount as Z The classical theory assumes, in other words, that the aggregate 
demand price (or proceeds) always accommodates itself to the aggregate supply 
price; so that, whatever the value of N may be, the proceeds D assume a value 
equal to the aggregate supply price Z which corresponds to N. That is to say, 
effective demand [which Keynes defines as the point where aggregate supply and 
aggregate demand functions are equal or intersect], instead of having a unique 
' ' Mill. John Stuart, l'ntnctplea of Pohttcnr Jrconotny, Book III. Ch xw. Sect. 2, 538 
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equilibrium value, is an infinite range of values all equally admissible; and the 
amount of employment is indeterminate except in so far as the marginal disutility 
of labour sets an upper limit. ' 
This is the crux of Keynes' argument against Say's Law, or at best, it is his most 
sophisticated dismissal of it. Importantly, Keynes' use of quotations is erroneous since he 
can find no classical economist who said precisely "supply creates its own demand. " The 
quote is simply a fabrication of Keynes', whether intentionafiy misleading or not He also 
ignores an explicit analysis of money, a serious error, especially since Keynes writes later 
that while Say's Law holds in a barter economy, the presence of money erases its 
relevance. Keynes implicitly assumes that money demand equals money supply (or simply 
neglects money period), though his greatest error is in ignoring forces for repricing of X 
and Z. He also ignores the basis of Say's Law — that the motive for production is to sell 
and subsequently demand 
While Keynes is the most famous ol' all critics of Say's Law, his references to it 
are surprisingly sparse. He devotes only four pages in his Genera1 Theory to Say's Law, 
and finds himself content to consider it totally refuted after that brief passage. Keynes' 
refutation of Say's Law fails on several levels, and what's even more important is that 
Keynes readily admitted that a refutation of Say's Law was the fundamental core to 
Keynesian theory Hence, if Say's Law stands, the Keynesian Revolution tumbles. 
'"' ibid. Vot VII, 25-26 
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XVI. Oskar Lange 
Oskar Lange (1904-1965) serves as perhaps the most significant contributor to clarifying 
the meaning of Say's Law in the Twentieth Century. He links Say's Law to Walras' 
Law, and while he cannot be considered a proponent of Say's Law, his contribution 
actually helps the argument for Say's Law. ln particular, his mathematical treatment of 
Say's Law provides a formalized emphasis on its role in a closed system Hence, though 
Lange is ultimately critical of the law of market's simplified assumptions, he helps us 
understand what Say's Law means. Lange's article "Say's Law. Restatement and 
Criticism" fueled a lengthy debate over the original intent and understanding of Say's 
Law by the classical economists. 
Given Lange's extensive treatment of Say's Law and in the interest of focusing on 
the key aspects of his article, a concise general outline for his reasoning is as follows 
Say's law states, according to Lange, that total supply of commodities identically equals 
total demand for commodities. ln a closed system, Walras' Law is a generalization of 
Say's Law, though Walras' Law does not rely on individual commodities (or markets) 
maintaining equilibrium, but rather, only an aggregate accounting constraint Aggregate 
money value of supply and aggregate money value of demand are equal under the 
necessary and sutficient requirement of the condition of monetary equilibrium. ln the 
absence of money, or when money is a "veil, " total demand for commodities equals total 
supply of commodities. Money and commodities are considered substitutes under Say's 
Law General overproduction may not occur only in the sense that unplanned 
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entrepreneurial profits must be offset by too optimistic planned profits in another sector 
or part of the system. Say's Law does not require or suggest that total supply of and 
total demand for (final) products must hold, i. e. , that each stage of production must be in 
equilibrium. Relative prices are independent of the money supply under Say's Law. 
Because Say's law excludes monetary theory, it follows that any monetary theory must 
inherently reject Say's Law This is the ultimate conclusion of Lange, that while Say's 
Law may stand in a simple economy, a modern economy using monetary theory of any 
kind presupposes a rejection of Say's Law Significantly, Lange — not Say sets up Say's 
Law to lead to conclusion. 
Lange makes no reference to whom or what served as the source for his 
understanding of the definition of Say's Law, but it seems unmistakable that Keynes' 
assertion that Say's Law means "supply creates its own demand" influenced Lange's 
understanding of the law. 1ndeed, Lange develops the proposition by Keynes that Say's 
Law regards unemployment impossible since aggregate supply meets aggregate demand 
He unflinchingly asserts that; 
Say*s law is the proposition that there can be no excess of total supply of 
commodities (general oversupply) because the total supply of all commodities is 
rcfenltcnlly equal to the total demand for all commodities Under certain 
assumptions as to the nature of the demand for money this proposition appears as 
a simply corollary of the general theory of prices. Associated with it is 
proposition that there cannot be such a shortage of total entrepreneurial receipts 
relative to total entrepreneurial cost as to cause losses throughout the whole 
economy (general overproduction) "' 
l. . ange, Oskar, [1942k mgav's Lais A Rcsiaicmcni and Crincism, " 5mChes m. tfmhemancal 
Lconmama uud Fc onomeimci, Rcpnnied, (Men York' Books for Libranes Press, 1968), (originally 
Chicago Uiuversiiy of Chicago Press 1968). 49. 
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As Stephen Kates interprets this passage, he argues that it "is a restatement of Keynes' 
definition of Say's Law — 'aggregate demand price of output as a whole is equivalent to 
its aggregate supply price for all volumes of output' — and leads to similar conclusions. 
Both Keynes and Lange agree that recession and unemployment are ruled out by Say's 
Law because total demand is always equal to total supply. "'" The most important 
implication from this aspect of Say's Law is that the price system is immaterial, i. e. , it has 
no effect on the relative prices and adjustment mechanism. In this price structure, money 
is virtually a veil. Lange is clearly unfamiliar with John Stuart Mill's brilliant arguments 
on this matter, particularly where J. S Mill clarifies that a shortage of money can exist. 
Yet it is from Lange's understanding of Say's Law void of J S Mill's approach to the 
law — that the debate arises over Say's IderrrirJ versus Say's Equality, and their respective 
relations to Walras' Law Gary Becker and William Baumol would later address Lange's 
understanding of Say's Law, concisely summarizing that "by summing over all 
individuals, we see that at any set of prices the total money demand for commodities will 
be equal to the total money value of the quantity supplied of all conrrnorfrties. It is this 
which Lange. [has] identified with Say's Law. ""' 
From the definition stated above, Lange considers a closed system, and through 
mathematical deduction, derives the formula for Say's Identity, which Lange calls 
"Wrzlras' Jrrrr because Walras was the first to recognize its fundamental importance in the 
formulation of the mathematical theory of prices It should be noted that Walras' law 
Kares. Snu V i. mr and itic i ernesi»» Jtevoi»lion, lii9 
"Becker. Gary S. aud vvilham J Baumoh "The Classical Mouciary Theory: The Outcorue of ihc 
does not require that the demand and supply of each commodity, or any of them, be in 
equilibrium. "' ' In mathematical form, Lange represents Say's Identity (or Walras' Law 
as) total demand and total supply being identically equal in basically a tautological sense. 
He then derives a similar equation which states that the demand for money equals the 
demand for supply. As a result, Lange combines both equalities to conclude that "total 
demand for commodities is equal to total supply of commodities only in a state of 
monetary eq iilibrium. "'" Lange seems to readily admit that under the condition of 
monetary equilibrium and under Walras* Law, aggregate money value of supply for goods 
equals aggregate money value of demand for goods. Becker and Baumol explain Lange's 
understanding of Walras' Law when they write that "If we call paper money a good and 
sum over all individuals, then by definition the total value ofgooCk (including money 
flow) demanded . is identically equal to the total value of goods (including money flow) 
supplied. This result, which Lange calls Walras' Law, has nothing whatsoever to do with 
equilibrium in the various markets, and holds for alI price configurations. "' ' 
However, Lange's criticism of Say's Law centers on his contention that the law of 
markets argues beyond the naturally acceptable equalities of aggregates under monetary 
equilibrium "Say's law makes a much stronger claim than either Walras' law of the 
equality of total demand for commodities and total supply of commodities under 
conditions of monetary equilibrium. It states that the total demand for commodities 
Discussion, " Lconr&rama 19(76k (Not 1952) 366 
'"' Longe. "Say's Law: A Restatement and Criticism- p 60 
'' Ibid. 52. 
"' Becker and Baumol. "Thc Classical Monetary Theotv, ** 356 
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(exclusive of money) is idenrically equal to their total supply. . . From [this] we see 
immediately that, in order that Say's law should hold, it is necessary and sufficient that" 
aggregate demand for money necessarily identically equals aggregate supply of money. ' ' 
Say never actually said what Lange asserts that he says, thereby taking away considerable 
strength from Lange's arguments. It seems clear, according to Lange, that this necessity 
for equality of money demand and supply implies that Say's Law holds in a barter 
economy. Hence, by this line of reasoning, critics like J. M. Keynes could feasibly 
acknowledge that Say's Law holds in a primitive barter economy, while attacking it as 
utterly useless in a more complex monetized economy. 
Extending the argument that Say intended that total money demand always equals 
total money supply, Lange states that "Say's law implies a peculiar nature of the demand 
for money, namely, that the individuals in our system, taken together, are al&vztys satisfied 
with the existing amount of money and never wish to hold either more or less There is 
never a desire to change the total cash balances otherwise than to adapt them to changes 
in the amount of money available. " Lange correctly addresses an error in Say's own 
thinking, yct he limits the scope of the understanding of Say* s Law by the classical 
economists in general He continues, suggesting that "this peculiar nature of the demand 
for money implied in Say's law was clearly understood by its original proponents They 
assumed it explicitly by stating that money is only a medium of exchange and abstracting 
from its function as 'store of value "'"" However, the understanding of price levels varied 
"' Ibid 52. 
"" Ibid, SS 
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amongst the classical economists; while Say himself shrugged aside concerns about price 
levels, not all of his contemporaries were that quick to reject the very possibility for price 
levels playing a role in the ability for Say's law to apply. While the classical economists 
certainly considered conditions with flexible prices and constant general prices, they 
recognized that factors such as government policies, long-term wage contracts, labor 
unions, and so forth, would invariably complicate the market's adjusting mechanism. 
Atter addressing what Lange considers to be the primary essence of Say's Law, 
he then turns to what he calls a proposition extending from Say's Law. In particular, he 
relates the classical view of entrepreneurial profit to their alleged argument that general 
overproduction or gluts can never occur Of course, as prior sections reveal, most if not 
every classical advocate of Say's Law conceded the possibility for general gluts under 
certain conditions. Lange asserts that 
From its very first enunciation Say's law has been associated with the proposition 
that there can be no 'universal glut' or 'general production' in the sense of all 
entrepreneurs suffering losses . Total entrepreneurial receipts are thought of as 
being identically equal to total cost plus some measure of profit (to be discussed 
later), and a deficiency of receipts with respect to one commodity must, therefore, 
be accompanied by a surplus of receipts with respect to some other commodity 
(or commodities) 'Overproduction' can be only 'partial, ' each partial 
overproduction being accompanied by a partial underproduction somewhere else 
in the economic system 14a 
While Ricardo does argue that a general glut cannot occur, '" it may be significant that 
Ricardo was less active in defending Say's Law than many of his contemporaries and his 
Ibid. 
'" As Lange quotes, Ricardo vvrites "Too much of a particular commodity may be produced, of which 
there ntay be such a glut in the markci as not lo repay the capital expended on it; but tlus cannot be the 
case vi ith rcspcct lo all commodities. 
" This passage is from the edition ol Ricardo's Principles o/r 
Political Liconomy and'laxorton, 227, cited previously. 
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contributions to the defense of Say's Law are both sparse and distinctly Ricardian in 
nature. That is, Ricardo defends Say's Law with distinctive arguments not advanced by 
other classical advocates. In a sense, Lange is addressing isolated arguments for Say's 
Law and treating them as though they were the generally accepted opinions of all (or 
most) of the classical defenders. While many of the classical economists argued from the 
understanding that the constraints of a closed system necessarily prevented a general glut 
from occurring, their primary concern was in addressing the cause of crises. 
Addressing the realm of entrepreneurial profits, Lange asserts that "an 
impossibility of realizing planned profit in one part of the system must be compensated by 
a possibility of realizing more than planned profit in some other part of the system. It is 
in this sense that 'overproduction can only be partial '" Lange concludes that "this holds, 
however, only for a purely capitalistic system ""' Consequently, Lange apparently 
accepts the implication by Say's Law that general overproduction cannot occur in a 
"purely capitalistic system, " which he ambiguously defines as "a system in which there are 
not direct services. "'" I have assumed that Lange refers to a pure barter economy when 
using the term "capitalistic system, '* though his exact meaning remains vague 
Lange then addresses what Say's Law does nor mean: "Say's Law, however, does 
nor imply that the total demand and the total supply of products are identically equal. 
bIeither does it imply an identity of the total demand and the total supply of primary 
'" Ibid. 57. 
Ibid. SC) 
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factors and direct services. "'" Through continued reasoning, he eventually concludes that 
Say's Law doesn't require "stability conditions" holding in the entire system, but "the 
existence of a stable equilibrium for two broad classes of commodities, namely, the class 
of products and the class of primary factors and direct services, " or the condition under 
which "net stream of money offered to entrepreneurs is equal to the ner stream of money 
demanded by them, and entrepreneurs can realize their planned total profit and their 
demand for new investment. ""' 
Returning again to the role of prices in Say's system, Lange concludes that due to 
the "peculiar nature" of money demand assumed by Say's Law, "Say's Law precludes 
substitution between money and commodities because it implies that purchases of 
commodities cannot be financed from cash balances and that cash balances cannot be 
increased out of the receipts from sales of commodities " Consequently, 'the demand and 
supply functions of commodities are, when Say's Law holds, homogeneous of zero 
degree, i e, a proportional change of all prices does not affect the quantities demanded or 
offered These quantities depend merely on the relari ve prices, i e, on the ratios of 
»155 prices " '
Becker and Baumol address the "allegations' and argue with clarity that the 
classical economists particularly Hume and Cantillon asserted no such theory of 
prices. Furthermore, they argue that Pigou's real balance effect "is part and parcel of the 
Ibid. 58 
"Ibid 59 
' Ibid, 63. 
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classical stationary state. ""' However, Lange ignores or rejects the evidence by several 
of the classical economists themselves, and concludes that "the traditional procedure of 
the theory of money involves a contradiction. Either Say's law is assumed and money 
prices are indeterminate or money prices are made determinate, — but then Say's law and 
hence the 'neutrality' of money must be abandoned. Say's Law precludes any monetary 
theory. "'" Ultimately, Lange finds that "Both in static and in dynamic theory Say's law 
leaves money prices indeterminate. " Thus begins the modern interpretation of Say's 158 
Law, with the particular emphasis that Say's Law applies exclusively to a barter 
economy. 
Lange considers the implications of Say's Law based upon his understanding of its 
original intent, and while his conclusions logically derive from his definition of Say's Law, 
he in fact derives his definition from Eeynes, rather than Say (or other classicals) It 
appears that Lange focused too heartily on interpreting what the classical economists 
meant without pursuing their own words in primary sources first His conclusions have 
been broadly accepted, and it might be reasonable to assert that Lange, rather than 
Keynes, most powerfully denounced the law of markets While a proper understanding of 
his formal consideration of Say's Law provides some strong arguments defending Say's 
Law, Lange's view should be considered one of mixed results he ultimately rejects Say's 
Law, but many of his arguments promote its soundnes 
"Becker and Banmol. "The Classical Monclaix Thcoir, " 364. 
Langc. 66-66 " ibid, 68 
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Law, Lange's view should be considered one of mixed results: he ultimately rejects Say's 
Law, but many of his arguments promote its soundness, at least under certain conditions. 
'" Ibid cs 
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XVII. Joseph A. Sehnmpeter 
Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) was a major critic of Keynes and Marx in the 
Twentieth Century. He contributed to the understanding and analysis of business cycles, 
and remains an important figure in economic analysis. 
Schumpeter provides a distinct analysis of Say's contribution. In his History of 
Economic Anctlysis (1954), Schumpeter addresses the theory behind Say's Law. First, he 
argues that free trade arguments derive initially from the clear understanding of free 
markets domestically This, he says, Say understands clearly in the sense that Say (as 
Schumpeter phrases it) asserts that "production increases not only the supply of goods in 
the markets but normally also the demand for them. In this seiixe, it is production itself 
(' supply') which creates the 'fund" from which fiows the demand for its products "'" 
Schumpeter then devotes himself to discussing the implications of understanding Say's 
Law in terms of aggregates versus partial analysis He argues that many crucial results 
arise from Say's Law, including a rejection of the possibility for general gluts. 
Schumpeter agrees with Sa 
While he is critical of Say's often-brash assertions and frequently muddled 
arguments, Schumpeter recognizes his contribution as important. "As stated, Say's Law 
is obviously true Nevertheless, it is neither trivial nor unimportant. 
"' " In a later 
Sebumpeter. Joseph A. . l19641 f7ts(oct ol I:coeomic. too(sat», 6"' ed (New York. Oxford Umversity 
Press. 196'), 616 
' ' Ibid, 617 
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discussion on business cycles, Schumpeter reveals most lucidly the actual importance of 
Say's Law: 
So far as the subject of crises is concerned, the main merit of [Say's] law was a 
negative one. Say showed successfully that, however large the phenomenon of 
overproduction may loom in the historical picture of individual crises, no causal 
explanation can be derived from it: there is no sense in saying that there is a crises 
becattse 'too much' has been produced all round. Though negative, this 
contribution was very important. It may be said to stand at the fountainhead of 
the scientific analysis of cycles to mark the point at which the latter broke away 
from pre-analytic thought. "' 
Clearly a recognition of causation in the understanding of crises leads to better reactive 
policies. 
Schumpeter is not a strong defender of Say's Law, but he recognizes its analytical 
soundness. He contributes to the debate as a major critic of Keynes, and as such, he 
provides insight into the role of Say's Law in the mind of one of the great economists of 
the Twentieth Century 
" Ibid 739 
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XVHI. W. H. Hutt 
Without doubt, one of the best analyses of Say's Law can be found in W. H. 
Hutt's A Rehabilitation of Say 's Law, published in 1974 shortly after Thomas Sowell 
published an inferior historical analysis of the law. It is Hutt who argues more 
emphatically than any other economist that Say's Law is of utmost importance. He states 
that a grasp of [the Law] is indispensable for an understanding of the true genesis 
of depression and of prosperity without inflation; that attempts at dynamic 
treatment of the economic system which ignore it are worthless; that new 
"withholdings of inputs or outputs, " mainly consequent upon the failure to price 
all such inputs and outputs for "market clearance" into consumption or stock 
accumulation, are the origin of depressed economies, that the path from that 
condition to non-inflationary prosperity is always uter the dissolution of such 
"withholdings"; that this objective can be achieved only by institutional reforms 
aimed successfully at creating incentives for (and/or the removal of disincentives 
for) the pricing of all inputs and outputs for "market clearance", and that such 
reforms facilitate the mechanism whereby (in the money economy) all inputs and 
outputs are (subject to inevitable human error) continually co-ordinated in the 
light of the current or expected value of the money unit. ' 
Clearly Hutt regards Say's Law as 'the most fundamental law in all economic theory. 
'*'"' 
Though familiar with I. he classical and modern arguments for and against Say's Law, Hutt 
comes to the conclusion that Say's Law is crucial to the understanding of 
macroeconomics. 
Before attempting to defend Say's Law, Hutt confronts the frequent objections to 
Say* s Law Perhaps directly addressing Lange's article, Hutt counters the argument that 
Say* s Law "tacitly assumes away changes in the demand for money and, in particular, 
Ib&d, 5. 
Ibid. . 10 
98 
overlooks those variations in that demand which are not correlated with real output. It is 
the latter charge which is most serious. " Hutt cites a variety of factors, including 
seasonal, temporary, speculative, preferential, or permanent, for individuals to alter their 
demand for money. "But none of these sources of variations in demand for monetary 
services, of which every monetary policy must take cognizance, affects the relevance of 
Say's law. "'" Hutt defends Say's Law against those who contend that it completely 
ignores the role of monetary theory. Furthermore, critics who cite disturbances (such as 
deflation or downward "sticky" prices) as arguments against Say's Law have it 
backwards, according to Hutt. "The cumulative depressive eAects of price rigidity in 
deflation (or in curbed inflation), " he writes, "are explained b):it. Supplies (hence 
demand) are rerthheld cumulatively. '*"' 
While Kates argues that "Hutt has a firm grasp of the classical meaning of Say's 
law and of its implications, "" Mark Blaug argues that Hutt adopts a radical view of the 
law of markets Writes Blaug, "lf the reader is now persuaded that he understands the 
meaning of Say's Law, at least in modern terms, he should take a look at W H. 
Hutt [who] argues that Say's Law is true then and now and, paradox of paradoxes, that 
it oAers a complete and satisfactory explanation of the inherent tendency to depression in 
the modern industrial society!" 
' 
Hun, W. H, :I Relnrhiliroiion of Xne V lore (Athens Ohio State press, 1974) 30. 
Ibid, 31 
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13)aug. Mark, Leonornrc rheong in retrospect, ( Cambrrdgc Cmubndgc Uuivcrsrt) Press, 1985), 178 
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Addressing Keynes' misunderstanding of Say's Law, Hutt quotes Keynes' 
General Theory and explains Keynes' erroneous reasoning. "Keynes thought that Say's 
law asserted that the 'aggregate demand price of output is equal to its aggregate supply 
price for all volumes of output, '" writes Hutt. "But this is not Say's law: it is 'Walras' 
Identity, ' which is a sophisticated statement of the obvious. Because the price of every 
sale equals the price of the purchase, aggregate sales must always equal aggregate 
purchases. Each transaction can be looked at from two angles!"'" Once again, Keynes' 
understanding of Say's Law comes under serious fire 
Addressing the criticism that Say's Law is unable to explain (or hold) during times 
of depression, Hutt retaliates boldly, arguing that "Depression is, indeed, the 
consequence of cumulatively-induced refiisals to sell at prices consistent iui th the cor- 
inudiriation of the economy. This is the truth which Say's law ruthlessly exposes. 
"' 
While Hutt addresses the various classical and modern oppositions to Say's Law, he 
acknowledges that unraveling Keynes' unemployment equilibrium theory is crucial to 
finding satisfaction with Say's Law. The controversy over partial versus general gluts is 
related to an analysis of recessions and depressions. Confronting the general 
overproduction argument against Say's Law, Hutt acknowledges that 
The fallacious notion of general over-consumption is related of course to the 
equally fallacious notion of general over-production. There is, in fact, no 
inconsistency (as some Keynesians have alleged) in Say's admission of the 
possibility off&articular over-production or glut, while he denied the possibility of 
general over-production or &ilut. There can be "too much" of any commodity, 
' ' Ibid. 33-34 
'" Htttt, 'I tteliatttlitniinn oDrav 's tnui, 37 
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but only in the sense that there is too little of another. Say could not have been 
more explicit on this point. ' ' 
Though Hutt may overemphasize Say's own understanding of the Law of markets, he 
recognizes the double-sided aspect of markets, namely, that too much of one thing 
implies too little of another. While Hutt does not expand his argument to the 
troublesome situations, such as when prices are inflexible or price levels are unpredictably 
dynamic, he clearly grasps the basic underlying argument behind Say's Law However, 
he would advance his cause better by providing direct quotes by Say (and other classics) 
that stated what Hutt claims that Say said. Hutt has been criticized by even those who 
agree with him for his absence of primary sources providing the foundation for his 
arguments '" 
The subject matter then turns to the Keynesian suggestion that markets 
chronically tend toward crises Writes Hutt, 
Chronic idleness of productive capacity in general is not due to its being 'in 
excess 
' Say's law explains how a widespread laying-off of men, together with 
idleness or idling in the complementary assets with which they work, is 
temporarily inevitable as long as chronic disco-ordinations (sic] in the pricing 
system are tolerated, and if the disco-ordinations )price-cost ratios incompatible 
with full market clearance) are not rectitied, the idleness will persist until the 
unutilized assets or the unemployed people find sub-optimal employments . . Say's 
law does nor, then, 'assume full employment" or imply that full employment is 
achievable whatever pricing (valuing) policies are adopted. What it doe» imply is 
that market pressures coitId, if permitted, have this effect. ' 
Contrary to the Keynesian models that presuppose inherent glitches in the market, the 
classical economists including Say analyzed phenomena based upon reasonable market 
' ' Ibid. 38. 
See Stephen Kaies' Soy 's Lnit nntI ihe Vevnextnn Revolntion 
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conditions, allowing for variations in the analysis to arise from additional restrictions to 
the market adjustment mechanism. Importantly, Hutt's passage demonstrates that he, and 
presumably other defenders of Say's Law, realizes the potential for a lag-time preventing 
immediate relief from a crisis. This extended period of idleness results Irom lags in 
adjusting, rather than from intrinsic market failure. Implicitly, this conclusion suggests 
that policy should work to lift the burdens on the market process rather than intervening 
in the market 
Some have contended that Say's Law holds in the long-run as a static equilibrium 
that results due to the inevitable equality between aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply in the long-run. However, it is then argued that Say's Law is insufficient at 
explaining short-run phenomena, and it is short-mn markets that Keynes addressed due, 
in part, to its neglect on the part of the classical economists Confronting these skeptics, 
Hutt says that "Some have thought that Say's law is valid only as a long-term theorem, 
that it would hold under 'perfect price flexibility'; but that it is irrelevant to the price-rigid 
world of reality. . . Actually, the law simply makes clear that, in so far as inputs or outputs 
are actually supplied, by being priced for sale, they are at that moment with no time 
lag demanding non-competing things 
" 173 
Turning to an important area of inquiry for this piece, Hutt then addresses the 
relationship between Say's L, aw and Walras' Law Hutt sees a clear and obvious relation 
between the two propositions; 'Walras' famous work can be reasonably interpreted as a 
Ibid, 39 
'' Ibid, 40 
102 
detailed, mathematical statement of the law of markets, although Walras himself seems to 
not have perceived it. ""' 
' Ibid 46 
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XIX. Gary S. Becker and William J. Baumol 
Gary Becker (1930 — ) and William J. Baumol (1922 — ) sought to address the 
classical monetary theory in their 1952 paper entitled "The Classical Monetary Theory 
The Outcome of the Discussion. " Becker and Baumol seek not to address Keynes' 
notably short and incomplete expose of Say's Law, but instead, to address Oscar Lange's 
interpretation, which they contend played the primary role in the development of modern 
economists' understanding and debate over Say's Law Importantly, Becker and Baumol 
reject Lange's viesv of the classtcal economists, and focus much of their paper on 
restoring the credibility of the classicals. 
Becker and Baumol identify Lange's understanding of Say's Law (where money 
demand is always equal to money supply) as Say's Identity 'An immediate implication 
of Say's Identity, or rather an equivalent. way of stating it, " they write, "is that the 
quantity of money demanded, considered either as a stock or a t1ow, is independent of the 
price structure and is always equal to the quantity of money supplied. 
" They conclude, 
"Thus, with Say* s Identity the quantity of money liow demanded must always equal the 
quantity supplied "' Furthermore, they argue that the equality between quantity 
demanded and quantity supplied of money tlow implies a similar equality between 
quantity demanded and quantity supplied of money stock. Say's Identity implies that 
money (or the price level) serves as a "veil" such that the doubling of all prices across the 
closed system causes no substitution betv, een commodities since relative prices remain 
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unchanged. They then cite a diITtculty with the classical system, whereby "the analysis of 
price determination is thus necessarily incomplete as it cannot specify (equilibrium) 
absolute prices. " Since the classical economists neglected to consider a cash balance or 
other sophisticated monetary theory, this contradicts "Say's Identity which, as we have 
seen, requires that the quantity of cash demanded equal the supply no matter what the 
price structure. " 176 
However, Becker and Baumol then modify this system by simply dropping 
Lange's spurious belief about the classicals, namely, that they assumed that the price 
structure and money demand are independent As a result, if all prices double in this 
system, then individuals can respond in the money market, by increasing (or decreasing) 
money holdings by substituting conunodities for cash holdings (or vice versa). Becker 
and Baumol remark that this new system "is thus clearly inconsistent with Say's 
Identity — supply of all commodities does not necessarily equal total demand for all 
commodities. In particular, these will not be equal if the price structure is such as to 
cause the quantity of cash demanded to dilTer from the supply" However, Becker and 
Baumol are able to reconcile this seemingly irresolvable contradiction by arguing that 
Say's Law may be interpreted to mean something other than Say's Identity. Specifically, 
"Say's Law can be interpreted in a way which makes it compatible with an economy in 
which the absolute price level does matter. This form of Say's Law, which we will call 
Say's Equality, states in effect thai 'supply will create its own demand, 
* 
not despite the 
"' Ibid, 357 
''" Ibid 338 
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behavior of the price level but because of it. "" Importantly, Becker and Baumol use 
Keynes' definition of Say's Law to describe Say's Equality. While Keynes may have 
distorted the meaning of Say's law, to find clarity in Say's Law within Keynes' own 
definition of it may provide a strong case in its defense. It may be advantageous to argue 
in the somewhat erroneous terms of the Law's opponents, since adopting their 
terminology could potentially further the cause of arguing skillfully that Say's Law does, 
indeed, hold. 
Becker and Baumol consider a system where changes in the price level matter, 
and assert that "The Cambridge equation implies that for every relative price structure 
there exists a unique absolute price level at which the money market will be in equilibrium 
(Say's Equality) " Equivalently, "for every set of relative prices there exits a price level 
which brings about ovieraII equilibrium in the commod 
of money offered for commodities is equal to the total value of commodities supplied 
Thus it is clear that [Say's Equality] is compatible with determinacy of an absolute price 
level. ' Llnfortunately Reeker and Baumol have, in part due to Lange's inaccurate , . 17fl 
portrayal of Say's Law, digressed to the point of missing the importance of Say's Law- 
its analysis of crises 
Ultimately, Becker and Baumol argue that Say's Identity was nor the 
understanding of Say's Law by the classical economists, and rather, they affirmed Say's 
Law in terms of Say's Equality Furthermore, their understanding of the role of price 
Ibid. '359. 
' ' Ibid 
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levels, contend Becker and Baumol, was not so naive as Lange (and others) believed. 
Their article provides considerable enlightenment of the possible meanings of Say's Law, 
and what they consider to be the most accurate definition of the Law according to the 
classical economists' understanding of markets. 
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XX. Modern Economists 
One of the central areas of inquiry for this piece is to gain a general understanding 
of tnodern economists' perceptions of Say's Law, if they have any at all. The lack of any 
serious treatment of Say's Law in essentially every single modern macroeconomics 
textbook seems proof enough that the Law is not a major consideration in modern 
macroeconomics However, its absence in textbooks doesn't illustrate what modern 
economists think or know of Say's Law, it simply reflects the fact that it is not considered 
important enough to be taught to students of economics. So what do modern economists 
exactly think of Say*s Law? Without question, there is no uniform answer. 1 sought the 
views of prominent economists who are openly non-Keynesian economists. The most 
indelible impression leA upon me is that great economic minds today do, indeed, believe 
that Say's Law holds 
An incident that occurred during my search for the modern underslanding of Say's 
Law leA an indelible market upon me When Nobel Laureate Gary S Becker told me in 
person that Say's Law holds both in a primitive (barter) economy and in more 
sophisticated modern economies, I realized that many modern economists (both 
macroeconomists and, in the case of Becker, microeconomists) accept Say's Law as a 
logical proposition that holds to varying extents (according to the individual views of the 
economists). However, despite this general acceptance of the Law, it is regarded as a 
subtle proposition, perhaps even underlying some of the common neo-classical 
macroeconomic models This can best be seen in the widespread use of Walras' Law in 
economics 
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Since there is little modern literature on Say's Law, I found it necessary to 
conduct conversations with several important economists and even a grad student. While 
the knowledge that I gained from these interviews may be unquantiftable, it was crucial to 
gaining an understanding of the modern perception of Say's Law. 
Perhaps the heart of the controversy lies in non-uniformity in the definition, 
meaning, and scope of Say's Law While none of the economists I spoke with offered 
identical meanings of Say's Law, the approach to it was similar. There seemed to be a 
general consensus that Say was dealing with common-man fallacies over the cause and 
nature of crises, and Say was countering the typical businessman's general perception, 
rather than academic circles alone Further, it seems important to modern economists 
that Say's words must be put into context, both in terms of the period in which they were 
written (which was, incidentally, a politically volatile period in France) and the audience 
for which they were intended. Hence, one can read Say's Trerrrise "charitably" or 
critically, without regard for the circumstances surrounding its publication 
Regardless of the specific defmition an individual economist identifies with Say's 
Law, it is clear that those I spoke with regard Keynes' definition that "supply creates its 
own demand" as insufficient to explain the depth and intended meaning of the Law 
Furthermore, they find ambiguity in Keynes' own meaning and understanding of the Law, 
for his explanation is neither complete nor comprehensive. 
While it is agreed that Keynes may have discredited Say's Law in terms of its 
importance to niany modern economists, those I spoke with generally agree that Keynes 
performed no solid dent in the logic of the I. aw, only in its widespread acceptance While 
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some argued that it may have been the laziness of many classical economists to properly 
flush out the snags in Say's thinking, others simply see the classical economists as not 
having developed a rich enough monetary theory to satisfy the constraints upon and 
complaints against Say's Law. Importantly, modern economists acknowledge that while 
the classical economists addressed the market under the framework of its self-correcting 
mechanism functioning effectively, Keynes' models relied upon a market which tended 
toward sluggishness or hitches in the market process. Hence, the two approaches 
revealed two very different views of the market place Taking Say's Law out of context 
and then questioning its validity in Keynesian models that assume price rigidity and 
discoordination problems lead to a rejection of Say's Law, but this rejection is built upon 
faulty arguments 
Those familiar with Say's own words observed that he intends qualifiers to clarify 
that he realized that short-run glitches in the market could prevent an immediate 
correction of the crisis. Hence, several economists regard Say's Law as simply a logical 
long-run proposition that must tautologically hold. Furthermore, as long as credit 
substitutes for money exist, periods of recession can and will occur. Say himself never 
fully explained or realized this, but it is a direct result from Say's Law. 
In general, those modern economists familiar with Say's arguments acknowledge 
that he did not emphasize the role of prices (relative prices and the general price level) 
enough This, of course, is one of the key areas which put Say's Law under fire The 
lack of a fully-developed understanding of the real balance effect by the classicals limits 
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their dealing with all of the potential problems that can cause a time lag in the market 
process. 
Even those who are not Keynesian economists (indeed, even several of the 
Austrian economists) admit that some of Keynes' contributions were important. For 
instance, Keynes sought to deal with real issues, such as depressions, which had been 
inadequately addressed previously. Even if Keynes was often wrong in his analysis, at 
least he focused on the problems that can arise due to intertemporal discoordination He 
illuminated the need for a focus on the point at which a downturn occurred and worsened 
(which Hayek called the "secondary contraction, " a recession feeding on itself until it 
spiraled down into a depression due to initially incorrect prices due to monetary 
influences, especially wrong interest rates). Therefore, while Keynes accurately identified 
those areas of the economy that needed greatest systematic analysis, his approach and 
conclusions were unfortunately incorrect, and led many economists down the wrong path 
for at least a period of time, Of course, Keynesianism had major political consequences, 
and even today policies are often argued for in Keynesian "creating consumption" terms. 
Most modern economists see a direct correlation between Walras' Law and Say's 
I aw, though the question over which one implies the other remains unsettled 
Regardless, modern economists undoubtedly see that the acceptance of Walras' Law in 
modern macroeconomics implicitly implies an acceptance of Say's Law Perhaps the lack 
of formalization of Say's Law, or even perhaps the fact that Say's Law need not be 
formalized, explain its absence as an overt macroeconomic principle. 
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Ultimately modern economists realize the potential for lags in the market without 
embracing Keynes' conclusion that Say's Law must be totally rejected. Aware of the 
concerns brought forth by Keyes, they answer those concerns without rejecting the 
integrity of Say's Law. Despite the dominance of AD-AS models, economist Lloyd 
Garrison believes that at least some of the neo-classical models suggest underlying 
elements of Say's Law. 
The conclusions I drew from my correspondence with modern economists is that 
Say's Law must overcome problems with intertemporal discoordination, prices (both 
relative and absolute), and money. That Say provided no explicit monetary theory and 
looked at the core of the issue in terms of money as a 'veil" may have opened him up to 
criticism However, he was attempting to go at the heart of the matter ceteris paribus 
ln that sense, Say's approach was helpful in isolating the nature of the problem To sum, 
the modern neo-classical models implicitly accept Say's Law as an underlying concept 
Say's Law is far more widely accepted than the modern textbooks suggest, for it appears 
that it is has found its place in modern macroeconomics, despite its virtual nonexistence 
by name 
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XI. Conclusion 
Henry Hazlitt writes that "what is called Say's Law was not originally designed as 
an integral part of classical economics but as a preliminary — as a refutation of a fallacy 
that long preceded the development of economics as a recognized special branch of 
knowledge. " Hazlett identifies the somewhat simple roots of Say's Law. 'Whenever 
business was bad, the average merchant had two explanations at hand the evil was 
caused by a scarcity of money and by general overproduction. 
'*"' It seems that Say's 
Law originates from and continues to exist as a subtle, implicit proposition Given its 
original consideration as merely a fundamental concept from which to pursue further 
analysis, it is remarkable that it has been the subject of enormous controversy 
Furthermore, economists such as John Maynard Keynes sought to discredit the classical 
economists almost exclusively based upon Say's Law — a secondary principle far from the 
forefront of economic thought by the classicals. 
lt seems incredulous that a peripheral idea of the classical economists has been 
targeted as their downfall, particularly since various versions of Say's Law remain 
prevalent even today. The definition of Say's Law is as controversial as its implications, 
for there is no uniform agreement over what exactly Say's Law meartrc Some of its 
greatest attackers have had little more than a superficial understanding of its definition. It 
may fitting, therefore, that most textbooks erroneously cite Say's Law as meaning that 
Hartctt, Henry, The Failure oflhe Peri heonoiaieec (Pitncton D. Van Nostrand Company. (959). 
reprint, (New Yor'. c Ttic Foundation for Economic Education, (99-1) 32-33 
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"supply creates its own demand, 
" 
since most of the economic profession has yet to fully 
ascertain the proper significance of Say's Law. It should be clear, after reading this 
paper, that none of the classical economists ever wrote that Say's Law means that 
"supply creates its own demand, 
" 
nor did they intend for it to mean that. To the classical 
economists, Say's Law was simply the formal proposition that refuted common 
misperceptions about the nature and causes of depressions. Say's Law argues that 
recessions result from too little production successfully being sold, thereby leading to 
overproduction (gluts) While it may appear that the cause is underconsumption, Say 
(and other defenders' of Say* s Law) successfully maintains that underproducrion is the 
root cause of the economic downturn 
The relationship between Walras' Law and Say's Law has been shown to be 
inconclusive Despite confusion by some economists over this relationship, it is logical to 
see that Walras' Law implies Say's Law, or perhaps to even suggest that Say's Law 
foreshadowed Walras' Law. The adoption of Walras' Law in mainstream economics may 
suggest that Say's Law is not as irrelevant to modern macroeconomics as its absence by 
name suggests. It may be that many neo-classical economists unknowingly accept Say's 
Law, or it could simply be that the historical confusion over Say's Law has prevented it 
from becoming a 'first principle" in macroeconomics Regardless of the reason, Say's 
Law is infused in all tirst-rate macroeconomic theory No economist has yet shattered its 
truth, and while some have claimed to destroy it, the Law of markets remains an accurate 
proposition 
Perhaps the most important conclusion derived from this paper is that even though Say's 
Law is absent from macroeconomic textbooks, the idea itself is embedded in Walras' 
Law, and consequently, some aspects of it can be found in modern economic analysis. 
Rejecting Say's Law invariably leads to incorrect analysis of crises. Hence, without at 
least an implicit understanding of Say's Law, macroeconomic theory falters. 
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